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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN 1961

H. SETON-WATSON

THE Soviet Union is one of the world's two giant powers. But it differs from the other giant, and from all Great Powers of the past in that it is also the centre of an international movement, based on a quasi-religious doctrine which claims to be an exact science of human society, able fully to explain the past and predict the future. Any survey of Soviet foreign policy that is not to be completely superficial, must begin with some consideration of this doctrine.

The most recent authoritative expression of the doctrine is the Declaration of the twelve ruling communist parties, published in Moscow in November 1957. The statement reasserted the conviction of communists that the whole human race is destined to pass through "socialism" to communism. It insisted that there are a number of "basic laws applicable in all countries embarking on a socialist course", while at the same time recognising that account must also be taken of "a great variety of historical national peculiarities and traditions". The first of the basic laws was:

guidance of the working masses by the working class, the core of which is in the Marxist-Leninist party, in effecting a proletarian revolution in one form or another and establishing one form or another, of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the light of forty years of the Soviet regime, and the vast output of political literature from Soviet sources, it is possible to interpret these phrases.

"Socialism" means the political and social system set up in the Soviet Union from the mid-1930's onwards. Socialists are persons working to bring about a system of this kind in their countries. No one else is a socialist. In particular, such social-democratic parties as the British Labour Party are parties led by traitors to the working class, serving the interests of the capitalists, and such Asian politicians claiming to be socialists as Nehru or Nu are left-wing national bourgeois misleading their peoples by the deceitful use of socialist slogans.

Marxist-Leninist parties are parties owing allegiance to the Soviet Union, co-ordinating their policies precisely with the needs of Soviet foreign policy. The Yugoslav League of Communists is not a Marxist-Leninist party.

Dictatorship of the proletariat means dictatorship by a Marxist-Leninist party. A proletarian revolution is a revolution which brings such a party to power. A revolution may be "violent" or "peaceful".

"Peaceful revolution" is also sometimes described as "the parliamentary way to socialism". Its meaning was made clear in the speeches at the twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, especially in that of Mikoyan, who gave as examples the seizure of power

by the communists in Eastern Germany and in Czechoslovakia. A "violent" revolution occurs when the enemies of the Marxist-Leninist party put up physical resistance, and have to be crushed by force. A "peaceful" revolution occurs when they surrender to the communists without a fight. The result is the same: the communists obtain complete political power, and use it to destroy their helpless opponents by force. Thus, in a "violent" revolution, force is used both before and after seizure of power by the communists, in a "peaceful" revolution it is used only after.

The distinction between "violent" and "peaceful" revolutions in regard to the seizure of power within a state has its counterpart in the sphere of international relations in the distinction between war and victory of "socialism" without war. In the first case, the non-communists states resist the demands of the communist bloc and war is necessary to subject them. In the second case the non-communists surrender without fighting. The result is the same, the imposition of a communist regime. The recent controversy between the Soviet and Chinese communists on this point was concerned with the question whether "the imperialists" (that is, the NATO states and their allies) would surrender without fighting or would resist up to the point of war. Mr. Khrushchov believes that the record of the Western Powers since 1945 shows that they will surrender, especially as with every year the relative strength of the "socialist camp" in the world is growing. The Chinese believe that the Western Powers at some point will fight an all-out war. But both Khrushchov and the Chinese assume that there can be only one result, the world-wide triumph of "socialism", that is, the imposition of communist regimes, controlled by Marxist-Leninist parties, on the whole human race.

If this is the long-term aim, the means available to achieve it are various. They include all types of weapons of war. Soviet military doctrine insists that the Soviet Union must be capable of waging all kinds of war—"conventional", small-scale nuclear and all-out thermo-nuclear. They also include a variety of economic instruments. The Soviet government controls the whole economy of the Soviet Union and the European satellite states. It can grant or withhold trade, grant or withhold economic aid. They also include various forms of propaganda—by radio, by the printed word and by public speeches at international meetings, in the United Nations and elsewhere. They include also various forms of espionage, subversion and guerrilla warfare. The Soviet Union is not unique in its possession of these various weapons: the United States has them all. But in its manipulation of these weapons the Soviet Union has two important advantages over the United States. It co-ordinates them permanently with each other, and it relates them systematically to its long-term aims. In the West there are endless debates as to whether military *or* economic means are the more

important. In the Soviet Union such either-or-ism is unknown. It is assumed that all the means will be permanently available. What varies is the selection of the immediate target, and the particular admixture of the different weapons which that target requires.

The Soviet leaders have no romantic love of war, such as both Hitler or Mussolini at times proclaimed. If war is needed, they will wage it, but if other means will achieve their object they will use the other means. One may doubt whether even the Chinese positively desire war (though they might be glad if there were war between the Soviet Union and the West with themselves as neutrals). There is no doubt that Khrushchov well understands the implications of thermo-nuclear war, and is no less anxious to avoid it than are Western leaders. But the more he is convinced that the West will surrender, the more he is tempted to brinkmanship. Thus disunity within the Western Alliance, "unilateralism" and pro-Soviet propaganda within Britain or other Western countries, materially increase the danger of war through misunderstanding.

To say these things, in the present mood of a large part of British public opinion, is to incur denunciation as a reactionary, a warmonger or a "professional anti-communist". Yet if the record of the Soviet Union, and the facts of the present state of the world, show them to be true, one should not be inhibited from saying them. Inverted McCarthyism is no better as a guide to wisdom than was the original McCarthyism, and honest men ought not to fear either.

But apart from those members of the so-called left and of the anti-American extreme right who form together the neo-McCarthyist lobby, there are well-informed and serious people who take a more optimistic view of Soviet policy because they believe that it is being modified by the changes in Soviet society.

Undoubtedly there are strong arguments in favour of this view. Soviet society has greatly changed since Stalin's death, and continues to change. Yet it is too early to speak of effects on foreign policy.

Far more attention is paid by the Soviet leaders to the consumer needs of the Soviet people. Though the priority for heavy industry remains, and the government retains all controls necessary to switch production, it is certain that supplies of consumer goods have steadily increased, and that the Soviet people are glad that this is so. A sudden reversal of policy would be difficult, except in a clear case of national emergency. There is one area of Soviet foreign policy where this can have considerable importance. China has vast needs for industrial aid. The Soviet Union since 1949 has given considerable aid, but always far less than China has wished. In the summer of 1961 the economic situation in China was more difficult than it had been since the communists came to power. There were plausible reports of widespread famine. Therefore Chinese

demands seem likely to become more insistent. The Soviet Government however has other claims on its resources besides the Chinese. It wishes to offer economic aid to neutral countries in which it is trying to acquire political influence, and it wishes to continue the increase in the Soviet standard of living. To satisfy the Chinese, while maintaining the other important commitments, would require new sacrifices from the Soviet consumer. But the Soviet people, who have had to tighten their belts repeatedly in the last forty years—to win the civil war, to carry out the Five Year Plans, to defeat Hitler, to reconstruct their war-ravaged country—and who for the last eight years have at last known a period of growing prosperity, cannot be expected to take kindly to the suggestion that they should tighten their belts yet again, for the sake of the Chinese comrades. Even Mr. Khrushchov would find it difficult to put this across. His difficulty would be increased by the fact that for some years the security police has been kept strictly in the background. The security police still exists, and it is physically possible to set the machinery in motion again. But it would be extremely unpopular, not only in the country as a whole but even in the inner circle of power.

Sino-Soviet relations, then, are a field where the growing prosperity of the Soviet consumer plays a part. Indeed there is already evidence that the Chinese regard the Russians as a rather degenerate nation, who have lost their socialist zeal as a result of comfortable living. This situation can produce a mounting exasperation on both sides, whose effects for the more distant future should not be underestimated.

But it is another matter to argue that, because the consumer now gets more satisfaction, he is in a position to exert influence on foreign policy, and to demand the abandonment of ideological objectives in favour of "live and let live" with "the capitalist world". The Soviet consumer benefits from present Soviet economic policy, but he does not determine it. The controls are held not by him but by the communist party. Foreign policy is even less within his reach. As for the general proposition that as people become better-fed, they become more peaceful, it is not supported by the historical evidence. Between 1933 and 1939 the standard of living of the German people notably improved, but this did not cause them to put pressure on Hitler to adopt a peaceful foreign policy.

Another important trend noted by observers of Soviet social development is the growth of a managerial class, or a "state bourgeoisie". For these people, who are members of the communist party but whose work is essentially administrative or technical, the main criterion is not ideological orthodoxy but professional efficiency. These are the people whom British professional or business people meet on visits to the Soviet Union. They impress them as hard-headed, efficient experts, the complete antithesis of

the starry-eyed communist idealist of fiction. It is easy for British non-political experts to return from such visits to the Soviet Union with the conviction that "communism doesn't count any more".

But the communist party was never ruled by starry-eyed idealists. The fact that the Soviet leaders, including those who are full-time officials of the party apparatus, are hard-headed and practical does not mean that they do not believe in communism. It is true that they spend little time talking or thinking about first principles of theological dogma. But they have been brought up on communist doctrine, and there is no reason why they should have abandoned it. It is important to remember that Soviet communists normally speak of Marxism-Leninism as a "science". They believe that they have in their doctrine a scientific framework within which the bits and pieces of international politics can be fitted together into a coherent shape. They believe that their Marxist-Leninist knowledge has provided them with a sure guide to action. The hard-headed practical men of the Soviet administrative and managerial class have had no reason to doubt this. Their leaders, the top men in the communist party who have planned and executed Soviet foreign policy, have had a virtually uninterrupted series of successes ever since the end of the Second World War. On the other hand "the imperialists" have retreated from one position after another. Why should the Soviet managers and bureaucrats doubt that Marxism-Leninism is a true science of human society, and that "the capitalists" are utterly decadent and doomed to destruction?

Mr. Khrushchov and his colleagues have asserted and reasserted on innumerable occasions their belief in communism and their determination to promote the communist cause in the world by whatever means are appropriate. They have acted as if they meant what they said. There is no evidence known to the present writer to show either that they do not believe these things or that they are acting in a manner incompatible with these beliefs. It would surely be wiser for western observers to pay them the compliment of taking them seriously, and at least to accept, as the best working hypothesis available at the present time, that the overall aim of Soviet foreign policy is the establishment of Soviet-type regimes, under Soviet control, in one country after another.

To recognise this as the overall aim of Soviet foreign policy does not make it necessary to indulge in moralising anti-communist rhetoric, or to fall into panic. The overall aim is pursued with great tactical flexibility. In each case those means are used which are likely to lead to success. This may be a source both of comfort and of alarm to the West—of comfort because it is most unlikely that such skilful tacticians as the Soviet leaders will launch into thermo-nuclear war, of alarm because it is unlikely that they will neglect any opportunity or abandon any objective (though they may temporarily postpone action). Western demo-

cracies are peculiarly ill-fitted to maintain a long struggle. Democratic politicians, and still more democratic editors, like to have clear, immediate and short-term problems. Hence the campaigns, especially in the United States, about the communist danger. When the danger did not become obvious, people were inclined to believe that it did not exist. But the communist leaders are not in a hurry.

Moral denunciations are particularly foolish. There are indeed actions by Soviet leaders which do require moral judgment (for example, the deportation of whole nations by Stalin, or the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by Khrushchov, or even the falsification of historical fact in the trials of Beria and his associates). But anti-communist orators like to denounce the morals of communists in such a way as to give the impression that the Russian people as a whole, and especially the eight million members of the communist party, are immoral or subhuman people. This of course reached its height during the heyday of Senator Joseph McCarthy. But any one who has had personal dealings with Russians, including members of the Soviet Communist Party, knows that this is pernicious nonsense. Indeed it may be argued that the moral standards of public and private life in the Soviet Union compare favourably with those in Western societies. McCarthyist nonsense of course rebounded on the heads of its authors. When American citizens began to visit the Soviet Union, and found that Russians were charming, friendly and civilised people, they realised that they had been told lies, and they naturally tended to assume that therefore everything they had been told about Russia was false, in particular that it was untrue that the Soviet government was the enemy of the United States. In fact, McCarthyism on balance contributed to the spreading of favourable illusions about Soviet policy. If the communists had invented McCarthy as an instrument for the promotion of their policies, they could not have done a better job. Yet the sad truth in international relations is that the charm and friendliness of peoples has very little to do with the policies of governments. The belief that a nation of enemies must consist of wicked men, and that a nation of friendly and intelligent men and women cannot be an enemy, is among the most harmful though also the most widespread illusions of democracy.

The aim of Soviet policy in 1961 is to destroy "the imperialists" (that is, the NATO Powers) by means other than all-out war. This policy has at present two main directions. One is to weaken the Atlantic Alliance by exploiting internal disagreements within it, and to disrupt it by defeating it politically in Europe. The other is to encircle it by a series of piecemeal successes in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The central issue in Europe is of course the German problem, of which the question of Berlin forms a part.

Here one must distinguish between the attitudes of the Soviet

government and of the East German government. Their ultimate aims are of course the same, but their priorities are different. Mr. Ulbricht's immediate purpose was to be rid of the island of liberty in West Berlin, which was both a reminder to his unfortunate subjects of a better way of life and a refuge to which in case of necessity they could have a good chance of escaping. With the erection of the wall in Berlin on 13th August, this aim has been substantially achieved. Ulbricht's longer-term aim is to bring about the reunification of Germany under his own, or his party's, control, by extending his regime to the Rhine and the Alps. Mr. Khrushchov certainly supports both these aims of his German satrap. But Soviet policy is concerned with more than the future of Germany. The main aim of the Soviet leader in Europe is to break up NATO. Whatever he does in the German problem will be primarily directed to this end. If he can greatly increase the disunity and mistrust within NATO, he will then be perfectly prepared to let the people of West Berlin live in freedom for some years longer. The decisive criterion, for Khrushchov, of any settlement with the West is not the extent to which West Berlin's liberty is undermined but the extent to which the NATO Powers can be made to quarrel with each other.

It is widely suggested in the West that a compromise could be based on recognition by the West of the Oder-Neisse frontier and of the East German government, in return for some guarantee of West Berlin's freedom. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see what guarantee of West Berlin could be devised which would protect it more securely than it is now protected, and which would ensure that the East German government would not interfere with West Berlin a year or two later. Ritual incantations about the United Nations are no answer to this question. The presence of a few hundred troops from Mali, Ecuador, Sweden or Indonesia, in U.N. uniform, in West Berlin, would hardly be likely to deter Mr. Ulbricht. If he should so interfere, a year or two hence, the only protection which could be given to the West Berliners would be the threat of the NATO Powers to go to war with East Germany, and if necessary with the Soviet Union too. But that is in fact the position to-day. In short, if all that would be changed by the suggested "compromise" would have been that the West would have recognised the Polish frontier and the Ulbricht regime with no advantage in return, it would not be a compromise but a surrender. Moreover, from the Soviet point of view, it may be doubted whether recognition of the Polish frontier would be an advantage. The only political asset held by the Polish regime (whose subjects are by now thoroughly disillusioned with Gomulka's government, as the liberties won in 1956 have been steadily undermined) is the argument that the Western Powers are supporting a West German plan to reconquer the disputed territories. Western recognition of the

Oder-Neisse line would deprive Warsaw and Moscow of this asset. Why should the Soviet Union pay a price for the loss of an advantage? Recognition by the West of Eastern Germany would however be of more value to Moscow, not because it would strengthen Ulbricht (this is a marginal factor) but because it would be a resounding rebuff to Adenauer, and a demonstration to the whole world that those who ally themselves to the West can expect nothing but betrayal.

To sum up, a "compromise" of this sort looks as if it would be a defeat for the West, but would not necessarily be acceptable to Moscow. Ulbricht would certainly like more than this. He would like the status of West Berlin to be defined in such a manner as to enable him to interfere with its internal liberties on the ground that "fascist propaganda" or "subversive activities" were being conducted there. If Khrushchov decided to accept such a "compromise", it would only be because he was convinced that it would create so much disillusionment in Western Germany that within a short time that country could be separated from the West, and NATO would break up. If he were right about this, the "compromise" would be not only a surrender by the West, but a disaster for Western security.

If no agreement is made, and Khrushchov makes his peace treaty with East Germany, he is in a strong position. If the East German government interferes with West Berlin, and the Western Powers use force against East German troops, it is they, not the Soviet Union, who are placed in an aggressive posture. Yet it remains true that even in this situation Khrushchov cannot avoid choice. He has to decide whether to authorise Ulbricht to interfere, and he has to decide again whether, in the case of Western force being used locally against Ulbricht's forces, he will take the Soviet Union into a world war. He has also to consider whether the first armed clash between small Western ground forces and Ulbricht's forces would not lead to the outbreak of a new revolution in East Germany, on the same scale as that of 1953, with possible repercussions in other countries of Eastern Europe. In an abstract sense it is clearly true that "Berlin is not worth a thermo-nuclear holocaust". But this applies as much to the Soviet Union as to the United States or Western Europe. The whole problem remains one of strength of nerves.

The world was informed that, when President Kennedy met Mr. Khrushchov in Vienna, he made it clear to him that the United States was absolutely determined to stand by Berlin. One must remain somewhat sceptical. Probably Khrushchov was impressed by Kennedy's personal strength of character. But he also knew that there were many factors in the situation which were beyond the President's control. Khrushchov knows that if an atmosphere of war danger is created there will be enormous pressure on the

West to surrender. The shrill chorus of the Afro-Asian neutrals at the United Nations, probably swollen by several new Latin American recruits, will clamour for "peace". Applying their customary "double standard", they can be counted on to place all the onus on the NATO Powers.¹ Powerful voices will be raised in the same sense in the West, at any rate in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In Britain the well-trying alliance of extreme left and extreme right will make itself heard in press, radio and television. The louder the chorus, the nearer the Soviet leader will be tempted to approach to the brink. Indeed, granted the inflexible purposes of Soviet policy and the realistic expediency of Soviet tactics, one may say that the most important variable factor in the situation, and the factor which is most likely to increase the danger of war, is neutralist and isolationist sentiment within Western countries.

From the Soviet point of view the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America fall into three categories.

The first category are dependent territories and territories in which, though they are independent states, an European minority rules over a non-European majority. This category, described by Soviet spokesmen as "colonies", includes both colonies in the strict sense and sovereign states such as South Africa. Here the aim of Soviet policy is to accelerate progress towards independence, or towards overthrow of European rule. The Soviet government is not able to exert much direct influence in such territories. Something can be done by training young people from these countries in schools and universities in the Soviet Union or the European satellites, and by recruiting to the communist party young people studying in Western countries. Indeed, it may be paradoxically true that African students are more easily won for communism in Paris or London than in Moscow, where they have sometimes had disagreeable experiences. The Soviet government can also influence these countries by the propagandist performances of its spokesmen at the United Nations. This institution provides a world-wide forum for Soviet propaganda, which, whenever problems of "colonialism" are debated, invariably adopts an extreme demagogic attitude and incites racial hatred. The fact that in the Soviet Union some 115,000,000 Russians rule over 25,000,000 Asian Moslems and 60,000,000 European and Transcaucasian Christians, while 90,000,000 more Europeans live under "indirect colonialism" in the European satellite states, is ignored. The Western press has made much of the bad impression made by Mr. Krushchov's desk-thumping at the United Nations. No doubt his behaviour displeased some of the more sophisticated Afro-Asian diplomats. Whether it displeased the younger generation of nationalist radical intelligentsia in Asia and Africa, is less sure.

¹These words were written two months before they were sadly confirmed by the result of the Belgrade Conference of "uncommitted nations".

The second category are countries which are independent and allied, or closely associated, with the West. These are considered by Soviet spokesmen to possess a fictitious independence. "The imperialists" maintain their rule by more subtle means after renouncing formal sovereignty. Obvious examples are Pakistan, the Philippines and Malaya. The group also includes countries which, the Russians argue, were at one time genuinely independent, but have ceased to be so as a result of the penetration of Western capital, or the maintenance of Western military bases, or both. Examples are Turkey, Iran, Thailand and the smaller Central and South American republics. Here the aim of Soviet policy is to bring about a change of foreign policy, leading to the adoption of neutralism. The nature of the internal regime is of secondary importance at this stage. Philippine large capitalists who are hostile to the United States are praised by Soviet writers regardless of how they treat their workers. In Venezuela the dictatorial regime of General Perez, who had been on friendly terms with the United States, was overthrown by a democratic revolution. At first the Soviet comment was friendly. But when President Betancourt, leader of the Democratic Action Party, maintained friendly relations with the United States, which clearly preferred his regime to that of the deposed Perez, the Soviet attitude changed. Soviet encouragement of neutralism in these countries includes all available means. Neutralist intellectuals are invited to the Soviet Union, great efforts are made to win over students from these countries studying in the West, communist parties are active (in most Latin American countries more or less freely, but in Asia illegally), and both threats and blandishments are freely offered to the rulers by the Soviet government.

The third category are independent neutralist states. These are described by Soviet spokesmen as politically independent but economically dependent. They include the Asian neutralist states and probably such large Latin American states as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico—though it is not quite clear how much significance the Soviet leaders attach to membership of the Organisation of American States, or to the signature of the treaties of Rio and Chapultepec. The aim of such states, in the Soviet view, should be to win "economic independence". "Economic independence" consists in the rupture of all significant economic links with the West and the development of far-reaching economic links with the "socialist camp". As long as "western monopolies" (that is, Western business firms) own significant amounts of property in these countries, and as long as these countries' trade is largely with the West, they cannot be considered "economically independent". The neutralist governments must therefore confiscate all important Western enterprises and reorient their trade. The development of the state sector of their economies receives guarded approval from Soviet writers,

but it is pointed out that economic assistance to the state sectors by the United States or other Western governments is dangerous. Only Soviet and satellite assistance is by definition "generous and disinterested aid". The "socialist camp" is by definition incapable of "imperialism", or of interference in the internal affairs of other countries. (The Soviet action in Hungary in November 1956 was disinterested brotherly aid to the Hungarian workers and peasants in their struggle against the fascist agents of "the imperialists"). The Soviet government, ably assisted by the governments of the two industrially most advanced satellites, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, is doing its best to push and pull the economies of the neutralist states away from the West and towards the Soviet bloc, by judicious use of credits and of trade. It has not yet achieved very much, but it has only been trying for about five years. With great resources at its command, it cannot be doubted that it will prove more successful in the next years.

The Moscow Declaration of the 81 communist parties of December 1960 introduced a new expression into communist terminology—the "state of national democracy" (*gosudarstvo natsionalnoy demokratii*). Previously, the phrase "people's democracy" (*narodnaya demokratiya*) had of course been well-known. In a people's democracy "the working class" (that is, the communist party) has all real power in its hands, though other parties, purged of their original leaders, are in some cases allowed to preserve a decorative existence in a fictitious governmental coalition. The East European satellites are the classical example. But in a "national democracy" the communist party does not control all power, and does not necessarily even formally share power. The essential conditions of "national democracy"—as the concept has been elaborated in authoritative Soviet sources in the last months—are that Western capital should be expropriated, that the state sector of the economy should be dominant, that there should be a radical land reform, that "the organisations of the toiling masses" (that is, the communist party and its front organisations) should have full freedom of action, that foreign aid and trade should be predominantly from and with the Soviet bloc, and that foreign policy should be a form of neutralism that is "neutral against the West". According to these criteria, in the summer of 1961 Cuba was a clear case of a "national democracy", Guinea and Indonesia were well advanced in that direction, and both Ghana and Mali possessed some of the distinctive features.

The aims of Soviet policy in the underdeveloped countries may be summed up as follows: to expedite colonies towards independence, independent allied countries towards neutralism, neutralist countries towards national democracies, and finally convert national democracies into people's democracies.

It is here worth mentioning briefly the most exposed of the under-

developed countries, which is second only to Berlin as a source of international danger. This is Iran.

Iran lies across the main road of advance from the Soviet Union through the Arab lands to Africa. It is of the greatest importance for Soviet policy to control Iran, or at the very least to detach the north-western provinces of Azerbaidjan and Kurdistan which give direct access to Iraq. Hitherto it has always been of great importance for the Soviet Union to have direct access to a country in order to control it. The Soviet leaders are Russians, whose strategic thinking is derived from a long history as a great land power. The presence of the Soviet Union on a country's frontier is an extremely important factor in political morale, encouraging to friends and frightening to enemies. One should of course not be too dogmatic. Communist influence is well entrenched in Cuba, separated by thousands of miles of ocean from the Soviet Union. On the other hand there are other examples which confirm the present argument. Albania has proved, after seventeen years, an unreliable satellite. The Iraq communists did well in 1958-1959 but have steadily lost ground in the last two years. The ability of the Soviet government to supply Mr. Gizenga's regime in Stanleyville has been hampered by the reluctance of the Sudanese government to allow communications over its territory. It would be too much to say that as long as Iran is allied to the West, Soviet influence is excluded from the Arab lands and Africa. It is however true that if Iran were in the Soviet camp—if it became, in fact, a "national democracy"—the opportunities of Soviet action in the Arab lands and Africa would be enormously increased. Possession of Iran in fact is one of the highest priorities of Soviet policy.

A Soviet invasion of Iran would lead to war, and therefore will not be undertaken unless war has already broken out elsewhere for other reasons. The best prospect for the Soviet government is internal disintegration in Iran, which Soviet policy will do its best to expedite. The regime in Iran has long been vulnerable. There is great poverty (though less than in many other Middle Eastern countries) and there is great and ostentatious wealth. There is social injustice and political repression. Neither were created by the present Shah: they are his inheritance from a very long history. But the fact that he has not removed them is held against him by the impatient, idealistic and ambitious intelligentsia of Tehran. Undoubtedly too the regime has positive misdeeds to its credit, and the influx of American aid has been diverted not only to useful economic projects but also to corruption at high levels of society which exceeds even the Iranian "norm". The strongest opposition movement in the country, that is, the movement most capable of mobilising the masses which can count in terms of power—the people of the capital city—is the National Front. This party showed, during the ascendancy of its aged ruler Dr. Mossaddeq in 1951-

1953, its complete incapacity to rule. If it should come to power again, as it may well do if the policy of orderly government and moderate reform of the new Premier Dr. Amini does not succeed, Iran is likely to enter a new period of anarchy which can end either in a new military dictatorship or in a "national democracy" indirectly controlled by the small but disciplined *Tudeh* (communist) party.

The National Front are neutralists. They genuinely wish their country to be committed neither to the West nor to the Soviet Union—which they dislike no less than they dislike the United States. Neutrality, playing off the West against Russia, is Persia's traditional policy. In principle there seems much to be said in its favour, and there is little doubt that most Iranian intellectuals (even those who do not support the National Front) prefer it. But neutrality is difficult and expensive. Sweden remains neutral by maintaining large defence forces, whose nuisance value is sufficient to deter any aggression. But Iran has neither the economic resources nor the social cohesion of Sweden. If she renounced American aid for her armed forces, the economic strain of defence on her economy would be not smaller but greater. Economic discontent would grow, as administrative efficiency diminished. Soviet pressure would become irresistible. Iranians sometimes argue that Afghanistan has done well out of neutrality. But there is no parallel. Afghanistan does not lie across the path of Soviet advance. By treating Afghanistan well, the Soviet government is able both to cause trouble to Pakistan—with which the Afghans are on bad terms—and to create a good impression on public opinion in India. But Iran lies across the Soviet road to Africa. The establishment of a neutralist government in Iran would thus be a great success for the Soviet Union, a major defeat for Western policy, and the beginning of the end of Iranian independence.

Such then is the overall picture of Soviet foreign policy in the summer of 1961, such are its aims in Europe and in the underdeveloped countries. It should be repeated again: there is no need to ascribe moral wickedness to the Soviet leaders, or to claim moral virtue for the West. The Soviet leaders have a doctrine which determines their long-term aims, and they have great flexibility in their tactics and great co-ordination of the various means at their disposal. Any student of international affairs who honestly seeks to understand realities must face these facts, and must not allow himself to be diverted by the smear campaigns of the inverted McCarthyists.

Soviet aims and methods are of course only a part of the international scene. Soviet policy reacts to the actions of other Powers, and to the impact of political and social forces. There are three combinations of factors to which attention may perhaps be directed in conclusion.

First, the pursuit by the Soviet government of "socialist" revolution coincides not only with an enormous growth in the material power of the state which was once the Russian Empire, but with an explosive upsurge of political consciousness among the young educated elites (*intelligentsias*, in the Russian phrase) of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. The Soviet aims are not new: what is comparatively new is Soviet strength and anti-Western nationalist fanaticism. In fact, the situation of to-day is not only a delayed result of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 but a direct result of the "revolution of rising expectations".

Secondly, the mortal danger in which the Western nations now find themselves coincides with greater material comfort than they have ever known. In the 1930's the rising danger of fascism coincided with widespread unemployment in Europe and America. It was an age of fear and want, and every one was aware of both. In 1940 everyone in England knew that Hitler's armies were just across the Channel. But in 1961 no less than 1940 the Western nations have their backs to the wall, yet they have "never had it so good". Whether within ten years Great Britain is a "people's democracy", its economy disrupted, its people underfed and millions in prison, will depend on the foreign policy decisions of the near future. But there is little awareness of the danger.

Thirdly, the evolution of the Soviet Union from equalitarian utopia towards a hierarchical and disciplined society coincides with the reaction in the West against any sort of hierarchy or leadership. The Soviet managers, bureaucrats and communist party officials are extremely conscious of their position as an elite, both of its privileges and of its responsibilities. The Soviet people may or may not dislike the particular leaders they have, may or may not grumble about methods and abuses of government, but they appear to accept without question the principle that a society needs leaders and discipline. In the West "leadership" has become a dirty word, equated with *Führerprinzip*. Because the fascists prated about leadership, and the fascists were evil, therefore, it seems to be assumed by the sophists of Fleet Street, leadership is evil. Here it is not so much that the people will not accept leadership as that the leaders refuse to lead, at least until they have been convinced by opinion polls and popularity contests that they are "giving the people what they want". There have been precedents for this situation in ancient history, and they are not encouraging.

These three combinations of circumstances give the world situation of 1961 its unique quality.

THE FOREIGN OFFICE ARCHIVES*

CLIVE PARRY

MY official auditors, if any, may be relieved to hear that this paper has been given a wrong title. What I am concerned with is not the Foreign Office archives but for the most part the public records originating with the Foreign Office. The term archives may or may not be used departmentally. The items it connotes are commonly referred to rather as papers. But certainly I am not concerned with the current papers. What I want to do is simply to draw attention to the great mass of material originating in the Foreign Office which has relatively recently become available to the public.

Some of this material has been available with the permission of the Secretary of State before this. And various of the classifications under which it is filed have been public property. For, although Coke defined a public record as "a memorial or remembrance of the proceedings and acts of a Court of Justice" the first Public Records Act of 1838, notwithstanding that it made specific mention only of curial records, enabled the Crown by Order to bring other papers within its purview. And under an Order of 1852 the contents of the State Paper Office were removed to the Public Record Office. Since that time the subsequent papers of various Departments of State have been periodically transferred to Chancery Lane.

We may learn from Giuseppi's Guide to the Public Records, which appeared in 1923 and 1924, that the Public Record Office was already in those years in possession of numerous series of papers of the Foreign Office itself extending down to the year 1905 and of the archives—incidentally so called—of various embassies and consulates abroad extending down to as late as 1915 in some cases.

From the information the Assistant Keeper then gave us we may learn also a good deal about the arrangement of the General Correspondence. Thus the latter follows a country arrangement, the letters and dispatches sent to our mission in Abyssinia, or the Abyssinian government or mission here, or received from those sources being bound up in the 56 volumes of Series Foreign Office 1, the American correspondence being Foreign Office 5, the French Foreign Office 27, and so forth. But the information furnished as to the content of each series is not always very full. For instance, Giuseppi gives us no hint that Foreign Office 83 contains the great and valuable mass of opinions of the Law Officers with which Professor Smith and Lord McNair have made us all so familiar. Indeed, there is no hint anywhere in Giuseppi that it has ever been the function of the Law Officers to advise the Foreign Office, al-

*A Paper read at the International Law Conference, July, 1960.

though he makes mention of opinions rendered to the Home Office and to the Admiralty.

That papers should be in the Public Record Office, and that an official publication of that department should give some details of them and of their arrangement did not, and does not, however, involve that they are accessible to the public. Despite their removal to or deposit at Chancery Lane under the Order of 1852 departmental records were accessible only down to such year as the head of the department concerned might prescribe. This was stipulated in the Search Rules periodically made by the Master of the Rolls in pursuance of his statutory powers.

Up almost to the time of the late war the date at which oblivion fell with respect to the Foreign Office was 1860. There was one little exception: even papers earlier than that date were generally unavailable if relating to the Newfoundland Fisheries.

Despite the general closure in 1860 a great deal of documentation covering later years was available within the covers of Gooch and Temperley's great series of British Documents on the Origins of the War. This publication, covering the years 1898-1914, represented the British contribution to the reaction to the Soviet revelation of the Krasny Archiv shortly after 1917. It was somewhat selective but it nevertheless constituted a considerable oasis in the desert of the closed years.

So matters stood in the middle 'thirties. The use made by scholars of what was available was apparently not really large. I am competent to speak only of what lawyers did but I am informed by my historical colleagues that their fraternity was on the whole even less active than ours. As to the lawyers, Professor Smith produced his notable two volumes entitled *Great Britain and the Law of Nations*, but that enterprise collapsed with the war. Lord McNair produced his *Law of Treaties*, the late Dr. Mervyn Jones his *Full Powers and Ratification*, and, during the war, the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht his *International Law of Recognition*. The last three works mentioned, and possibly also that of Professor Smith, did not, incidentally, rely exclusively upon papers from the open period. The authors were able to avail themselves of the now celebrated invitation of Sir Eric Beckett, then second legal adviser, to consult, and to a degree to quote from, papers of a date later than 1860.

It is not perhaps difficult to understand why greater use was not made of the Foreign Office papers in the Public Record Office. For the process of their consultation was and to a degree still is a somewhat complicated and tedious one. One must wait at least half an hour for a volume to be produced. And the rules of the search room require that all copying shall be done in pencil. To say this is not to criticise the Record Office, who have a just reputa-

tion for helpfulness and who for many years have made photo-stats for those who can afford them. The plain facts are that our ancestors, up to the turn of the century, wrote their original drafts in long-hand, and often in very difficult long-hand. And they wrote a great deal. For instance the series of law officers opinions rendered to the Foreign Office up to 1860 occupy 200 large volumes. The whole general correspondence for the years 1860 to 1897 occupies no less than 26,000 volumes. If such collections must be examined volume by volume the process is necessarily tedious and well nigh unending. Maitland wrote somewhere of "the weariness that is physical in turning over sheepskins". As one who has turned over some thousands of volumes of the Foreign Office papers I may myself testify that it is no inconsiderable physical task, and incidentally not one for a person who cares overmuch for clean cuffs.

But let us see now what has happened since the late war. First, soon after its termination, what I may term the date of the ending of legal memory was brought forward first to 1885 and then to 1901. This development was of great use to, among others, Dr. O'Connell in the preparation of his now well-known and very useful monograph on *State Succession*. And then, as a result of the Public Records Act, 1958 the end of the closed period was brought forward to 1908 and will in future move forward each year so as to lag but fifty years behind the present day. Meanwhile new oases within the shortened closed period have been created as a result of the appearance of the various series on *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*.

Insofar as legal documentation is concerned, Sir Eric Beckett's successors have been even more accommodating than he was and, as is now fairly widely known, a team of young people is presently working within the Foreign Office Library with a view to the preparation of a Digest of International Law comparable to those great American compilations associated with the names of Moore and Hackworth. It seems to me, however, to be somewhat premature to give a public account of the trials and errors of this venture. It is moreover, perhaps inappropriate to dwell too much upon mere law when speaking under the auspices of the David Davies Institute.

In such time as may remain to me, therefore, I want to speak less about the projected Digest than about a remarkable development of even more general interest to students of international affairs. This is the public distribution of the Foreign Office confidential print for the open period.

That the several departments of state habitually print documents for internal use and that, before the typewriter came into fashion, they did so upon a lavish scale are matters neither of confidence nor for surprise. Many libraries have for long contained, for instance, the printed cases of arbitral proceedings in which this country has

been engaged. And one may encounter, bound up in the manuscript volumes in the Public Record Office and in such collections in private hands as the Hardinge papers in the Cambridge University Library, fragments of what are evidently extensive printed series. Yet until comparatively recently scholars have made, or have been able to make, very little use of this source. Although since 1861, and also in respect of certain earlier periods such as that of the Crimean war, the Law Officers' opinions rendered to the Foreign Office have been regularly printed each year, I cannot discover that the printed versions were available to Professor Smith. Perhaps the explanation is that at the time he was working the open period ended in 1860. Presumably Gooch and Temperley used the confidential print to some extent, though I am not sure how far. Lord McNair, however, relied on it very much in respect of the later years treated in his *International Law Opinions*. The compilers of the *Documents on British Foreign Policy* have used it extensively. And, insofar as Law Officers' opinions are concerned, the Colonial Office series for the open period, which includes moreover opinions addressed to the Foreign Office and communicated interdepartmentally for information, has for some time now been on the open shelves of the Colonial Office Library.

But until very recently indeed nothing like a complete run of any departmental print series for any period of years has, to my knowledge, been available outside the reference room of the department concerned. This valuable source has thus been available only to persons working within the departments, such as the compilers of the *Documents on British Foreign Policy*. A year or two ago Lord McNair obtained for the Squire Law Library a copy of the printed volume of the Law Officers' reports for the period of the Crimean War. More recently I have obtained for ultimate deposit in the same place a complete run covering the years 1861-1908.

The relation this little collection bears to the whole may be judged if I point out that it comprises almost fifty volumes containing something slightly less than ten thousand opinions—about ten times the quantity Lord McNair has made available to a wider public in the three volumes of his *International Law Opinions*. But these fifty or so volumes represent merely fifty or so in the running numbers of the Foreign Office print. And by the end of the open period in 1908-1910 the consecutive numbering of the print has almost reached the number 10,000. The volumes of opinions are sizeable as compared with some single papers which achieve the dignity of running numbers. But they are less bulky than many items such as the fat volumes on the Slave Trade or the Newfoundland Fisheries. The running number system, moreover, does not reveal how often a document, appearing late, has been given an asterisk, or two or even three asterisks, as well as a number, thus swelling the total in the series beyond the figure the last running

number would suggest it contains. Taking these into account, it constitutes no more than about one two hundredth of the whole and it may be estimated that the whole print runs to some 3 million pages and will cover the walls of a sizeable room.

These estimates are not based merely on the running number system nor upon a sight of the formidable presses in the reference room. A more detailed inspection of most of the series has been possible. For very recently indeed, through the initiative of Mr. F. H. Hinsley, the Cambridge Faculty Board of History has obtained possession of a very large collection of the Foreign Office print for permanent deposit in the University and I and my collaborators on the Digest project have been engaged in cataloguing, and even reading, this collection. My calculations may nevertheless seriously underestimate the dimensions of this magnificent acquisition.

I have described it as a magnificent acquisition. But of what utility is it? It may be felt that its value is reduced because, firstly, the print contains only a selection from the original papers and because, secondly, it can only afford a view of events from one particular viewpoint—the contemporary British viewpoint.

Taking the second objection first, it is of course true that the Foreign Office print does not comprehend the Quai d'Orsay or the Wilhelmstrasse print, if there are such things. But that is of course obvious. And it must remain true that, within the obvious limits, the mere Foreign Office print is of some utility to historians—to historians of British foreign policy, for instance. It is also of course true that none of us can ever appreciate fully the consequence of our actions. There is little in the way of a standard of reasonable foreseeability in public affairs. The *Kriegsschuldfrage*, the question of responsibility for the first World War, may indeed not be capable, in a certain sense, of solution on the exclusive basis of materials dating from before the outbreak of that war. But again there is no more than an obvious circumstance involved here. I cannot myself of course claim any competence to assess the significance of these rather obvious factors for historians. However, as a student of international law I cannot fail to find the problem interesting. For, since customary international law consists in the practice of states accepted as law, and not in practice confined to a single state, the question does arise for us as to what weight is to be attached to evidence emanating from a single state. Further, there arises the question as to what constitutes practice. Is what a state does alone significant or may we take account of what it says? And even assuming that, as may more often than not be the case, doing consists in no more than saying, what weight are we to attach to internal pronouncements. Is what the Law Officers, or the departmental legal advisers, say by way of advice to the Secretary of State no more than, as it were, a muttering under the breath—as the Government of the United States has sometimes

claimed the series of Presidential messages to the Congress to be? This question I have explored further elsewhere.

Coming now to the question whether the print is not "selective" of the original papers in the sense that it does not reproduce all of them, this is of course true. It does not, however, follow that the omissions are calculated to give a false impression. A Parliamentary paper may indeed omit much that is intrinsically important for various reasons, including a consideration of the public interest which may or may not be mistaken. But what motive has a Department for concealing things from itself in communications which may for convenience assume printed form but which are not intended for publication? No doubt any officer of a Public department thinks twice before he puts pen to paper. So do we all, one hopes. No doubt, too, there are men lacking in moral courage in the public service just as there are in other walks of life. In a few cases perhaps, considerations of security impel even a public department to refrain from putting pen to paper at all. Surely however, these are the only limitations upon the candour of the print. May we not remember, too, that during the great flowering-time of the print—the second half of the nineteenth century—no thought that it would ever be publicly disclosed could have entered anyone's head. Occasionally, no doubt, a dispatch or minute passed through the print into a Parliamentary paper or into the *London Gazette*. Yet leave may be taken to doubt whether this consideration was ever in the minds of writers of dispatches or minutes other than, for instance, generals making reports upon military operations intended from the very start for public disclosure. Even now, when the period of oblivion has shrunk to fifty years, it would not seem credible that a public officer fears the scrutiny of posterity. An Attorney-General of the United States may well feel the hot breath of the public upon him when he sits down to advise the Department of State. For the majority of his opinions have been regularly published for more than a century. One may in consequence respectfully applaud the inflexible refusal of the British Law Officers to any shortening of the fifty-year period of closure with respect to their opinions.

Reflection ought to enable the charge that the print is selective in the sense that it contains deliberate omissions to be disposed of easily. After all, the print is older than the typewriter. The printing of a document or series of documents was, up to a comparatively late date, the simplest method of making multiple copies. But it does not of course follow that all that was or has subsequently proved to be important was printed. For instance recently I found a reference in a printed dispatch from H.M., Minister in Lisbon to "the late correspondence with the German government over the Franconia case". And so far I have not discovered the correspondence in the print. But the probability is that I shall

ultimately do so. For how else could the Legation in Lisbon have known of the correspondence unless via the print which would have been distributed to it?

One understands it to be official experience that going behind the print is generally an unnecessary exercise. That is to say, the print proves to be fully exhaustive of the manuscript insofar as it exists. But it still does not follow that the print is exhaustive altogether. Here the only thing to do is to test the matter. And there is being conducted under the auspices of the Digest project a comprehensive experiment to this end. The intention is to read some 12½% of some 19,000 MS volumes for the years 1860-1897 against the print. I am, however, bold enough to guess already what the result is likely to be: that very little of significance failed to find its way into the print.

If this be so, or even if it be not so, the print constitutes a most valuable source for both historians and international lawyers. It still remains such a source even if it be not exhaustive because of its intrinsic content. No doubt it is a source of less than absolute value and one which must be employed with every regard to the limitations of its content. What then is its content?

This is a question bound up with that of accessibility. The series comprehends in the first place much of what is in the many thousands of MS volumes of the General Correspondence of the Foreign Office. For the student who requires to consult the incoming and outgoing dispatches and the minutes upon them, therefore, they are for the most part here in a form infinitely more convenient than the originals. It comprehends also many hundreds, indeed thousands, of memoranda prepared by the Foreign Office Library and by other departments. And, because, as has been explained, the insertion of them in the print was so often a means simply of securing either circulation or multiplication of copies, it contains also many hundreds of papers which are in fact accessible elsewhere and which may not even have been reprinted but have rather been assigned a running number and inserted in the series in their original form. In this category come, for instance, Orders in Council, dispatches, chiefly military, and other items published in the *Gazette*, and even occasionally publications of foreign governments.

These individual papers are on the whole of more value to students of international law in particular than the regular series of dispatches. Among them one will find, for instance, memoranda on many specifically legal topics, such as diplomatic privilege, State responsibility and the like. But it is probably useless to describe them unless the limitations upon their accessibility which still exist are also described. As I have said, an incomplete run of the print has recently been acquired by Cambridge University. I understand that Rhodes House, Oxford and the Institute for

Commonwealth Relations, London are in the process of acquiring similar incomplete runs. Where, however, is there a complete run?

One might expect the answer to be: in the Public Record Office. But the run there, though it goes well into the closed period—a circumstance of indifference to the public except in so far as, under the new Act, the beginning of that period retreats, is also incomplete and is so described in the new Guide to the Public Records which, incidentally, is now available in the Search Room in mimeograph form and which will shortly be printed. Possibly the Record Office run is slightly more extensive than those acquired by the Universities. But it is confined in principle to the general correspondence and excludes memoranda and the other miscellaneous items which, as I have explained, have from time to time acquired the dignity of running numbers and thus formal inclusion in the print.

It must be a matter for consideration whether the incomplete runs now available cannot or ought not to be completed. Parenthetically it does not follow that this is possible or that an entirely complete run exists anywhere. This question cannot, however, be explored unless the question of the arrangement and indexing of the series is first examined. As to this, the Public Record Office makes available a catalogue only of what it possesses. This naturally gives no hint of what is missing. And this catalogue, though masterly in a sense, has some defects. It ignores both the running number system and the arrangement by countries employed within the Foreign Office at least during the last century and to a great extent still. As a matter of history this arises because, when about 1926 the Public Record Office began to acquire the current print, it employed in its arrangement the divisional system then followed in the Foreign Office—a system quite appropriate to the classification of a series entitled, for instance, "Affairs of South-East Europe". When the Record Office obtained the bulk of the earlier print it appears to have attempted to project this system of classification backwards. The result is that the Record Office catalogue corresponds to no other.

It would, however, be quite easy to construct a key for the conversion of the Public Record Office references into others. Here we encounter a difficulty but one which, happily, time will cure. For the first 10,000 numbers of the print take one up to just after the date at which the closed period begins and the two printed indexes of those numbers, the one arranged by subject and the other by country are thus not available generally as yet. But these, and the numerical list, which is not printed and is really no more than the printer's register of the numbers he assigns chronologically to the materials he deals with, are the only sources from which the whole content of the series may be determined. The subject and country lists indicate, moreover, that the master set within the Foreign

Office is bound up neither according to the divisional system followed by the Record Office nor according to running numbers, but following a country arrangement.

It is to be hoped that these lists will in time be communicated to the curators of the various runs now available outside the Foreign Office—to the Record Office for purposes of construction of a catalogue of individual documents with a key to their Record Office classification, and to the learned institutions to enable them to determine how their own holdings should be arranged. The latter bodies might well prefer to adopt the Foreign Office rather than the Record Office system. If so, and there is much to be said for it, the construction of a key becomes very necessary. For it must influence the system of references used by authors relying on the print. Suppose one wishes to refer, for instance, to an item entitled "Further Correspondence respecting the 'City of Mecca'," dated 1884. The running number is 5153. In the master set this is bound up in Portugal, volume 10. In the Record Office, however, it is to be found, if at all, under the reference F.O. 425.

The giving of access to the printed indexes will disclose what is missing from the runs now available to the public. And no doubt it will expose the custodians of the incomplete runs to pressure to fill the gaps. The Librarian and Keeper of the Foreign Office Papers may then find himself under pressure. I should not like to think that my remarks had produced this result. It would seem proper, therefore, to emphasise again that much of what is nominally in the print is accessible elsewhere: for instance, extracts from the *Gazette* and Orders-in Council—though any reader of the preface of the Consolidated Orders-in-Council in Force of 1894 will appreciate how very difficult it can be to find the text of an Order-in-Council dating from before the period of the annual series, which began in 1890. It is questionable whether such items merit any place in the Record Office among the print simply because they were once circulated within the Foreign Office as part of that series. Again, it ought to be stated that of not a few items no spare copy exists. And finally I may say that, with the benevolent co-operation of the Deputy Librarian and Keeper of the Papers, numerous items are being collected for purposes of the Digest project which will ultimately be added to the Cambridge run. It is also proposed to microfilm a number of items of which no copy exists.

ON UNDERSTANDING INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

CONTINUATION OF A DISCUSSION

Would you please permit one who has followed the debate in your forum on 'Understanding Indian Foreign Policy' between Mr. Alan de Russett and Dr. A. Appadorai, to join it?

Russett is quite right in believing, as a matter of fact and not opinion, that India upholds her policy of non-alignment as a valid prescription for all (i.e. excepting the Great Powers themselves). If, as Appadorai erroneously believes, that is not the case, then, students of international relations have been wasting their time and energy in analysing and debating an issue of no consequence to the rest of the world. In fact, however, next to the 'cold war', the policy of non-alignment followed by India and some other countries and, what is more important, insistently and persistently recommended for other nations, especially in Asia and Africa, is a vital issue of current international relations. It is not for nothing that so much time and energy is being constantly spent in the Foreign Offices of the Western Camp to counter the increasingly popular tendency towards (what in the West is called) 'neutralism' among the newly-independent Asian-African countries, had they been assured and satisfied that India was ploughing her lonely furrow of non-alignment, without any desire or efforts to urge a similar policy on other countries as well. Fortunately, whether or not India does hold the policy of non-alignment as a valid prescription for all, is not a matter of opinion, but of facts, and as against the single and recent opinion, as of the Indian Prime Minister on which Dr. Appadorai's assertion is based, one could quote scores of other statements by the same authority in the past to support the contrary view, i.e. in support of Russett's inference. Even the isolated remark cited by Appadorai does not, on close reading, support his view. Prime Minister Nehru still insists that 'although it would seem good for everybody, it might be more difficult for others'. Finally, Appadorai does not, seem to have sufficiently pondered over the implications of his (and now Prime Minister Nehru's also, as he suggests) view. When once India concedes that non-alignment is a limited policy valid only to herself, then, some other essential features of her policy are undermined. Thus, for instance, India could no longer oppose with any justification, as she does now, the policy of military alliances and pacts, especially in Asia, because if non-alignment is not necessarily a valid policy for all, then, equally, opposition to military alliances is also not a good policy for other nations. In truth, however, India has been persistently and vigourously opposing the policy of military alliances, *not* so much because it is bad for India alone, but *more* be-

cause it is dangerous to world peace. Thus, when once Appadorai's view is accepted, the whole fabric of India's distinctive and characteristic foreign policy would be shaken. Then, India would no longer deserve the importance and attention that the world has been giving her, because, after all, India has no special message for a world torn asunder by the 'cold war'. Is this a prospect the Government and people of India would welcome?

Secondly, after having wrongly (in my view) disagreed with Russett on one issue, Appadorai, again wrongly in my view, agrees with Russett's unjustified view that India is exploiting an equilibrium *created* by others. This has been for long a stock Western jibe at India's role in world affairs, which is often coupled with the assertion that India could afford to do this in the belief that the West would come to her rescue in case of threat to her security. The briefest way of disposing of this thesis is to cite the communist view. It is stated that 'it was the increasing might of the Soviet Union and the resurgence of China under Communist leadership that created the objective conditions under which nations like India obtained elbow-room for an independent diplomacy and opportunity to promote a peaceful settlement'. But for the Soviet Union and China, it is said by Communist sources, 'there would be today no balance to tilt but a world dominated by Washington'.¹ As a matter of fact, the unique role that India is playing in world affairs today is not due to the goodwill and generosity of either Washington or Moscow, nor is it even a by-product of their respective foreign policies; that policy is genuinely and firmly rooted in India's past history and traditions as well as present geopolitical factors and circumstances.² On the other hand, both Washington and Moscow would very much like to annex India to their respective camps; if they are tolerating India's policy, it is only because it suits their own national interests.

Thirdly, Appadorai is also in error in conceding the alleged rightness of Russett's view that the Indian approach to world peace and settlement of international disputes is merely supplementary to that of the West which is based on power, and not, as I believe rightly, an alternative to Western approach. Be it noted that we are not concerned here with the practicability or efficacy of either of the approaches to peace; we are only concerned as to whether or not India's approach is distinctively a substitute for the Western approach. How the Indian policy of non-alignment with the bipolarised world, of vigorous opposition to military pacts and alliances and to the establishment of foreign military bases, of manufacture and testing of weapons of mass destruction, and of the creation of 'positions of strength' can be a mere *supplement* to the

¹ L. Natarajan, *From Hiroshima to Bandung: A Survey of American Policies in Asia* (New Delhi, 1955). p.176.

² On this point, see further M. S. Rajan, 'Indian Foreign Policy in Action 1954-56', in *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), July-September 1960, pp.229 ff.

policies of the West which stand for all these, is beyond anybody's comprehension. As for the policy and attitude to the settlement of international disputes, while both the Western Camp and India stand for pacific settlement, India exasperatingly (i.e. to the West) emphasises the *pacific* aspect, and the West is inclined to emphasise the *settlement* aspect. India's policy does not concede the use of force in inter-state disputes in any situation but for self-defence conceived in the narrow sense of the term. (e.g. as in Kashmir). The Western camp has made it repeatedly and emphatically clear to the Communist camp that it would use force in defence of its rights, as in Berlin. There is nothing in common between the two approaches to world peace or the settlement of international disputes. If, as Russett and Appadorai suggest, the Indian approach is only supplementary to that of the West, in other words, if the foreign policy differences between the two are not as fundamental as I believe they are, then, it would seem difficult to understand why India has not merged herself with the Western bloc; if that were so, it would be even more difficult to understand the tremendous amount of criticism and antagonism in Western countries towards India's international policies and actions. On the contrary, it is this fundamentally different and divergent approach to world peace and the settlement of international disputes which have kept India and the Western camp apart; it is not so much because of the less fundamental, though important, differences over such other issues as colonialism and racialism.

R.S.M.

THE quality that most impressed me in Professor Appadorai's reply to my article is his fair-mindedness, strengthened by his complete understanding of my analysis and his assured confidence in his own. He has the capacity not only to present his case with lucidity, but, when occasion demands, to reproduce my arguments with more clarity than I myself achieved. He has not only opened, but excellently paved, the way to further useful exchanges of views.

By contrast, R.S.M. seems emotionally dependent upon preserving in all its unsullied splendour a romantic vision of India, "ploughing her lonely furrow" among misguided powers, pursuing her "unique role", preaching her "special message", practising her "distinctive and characteristic" foreign policy, and so on, like a wise virgin. This is magnificent, but it is not real life. And inevitably, as always in such cases—for R.S.M. is a universal figure; we have him in all countries—objectivity and careful understanding of the views of other people are sacrificed to the greater cause of denouncing apostasy. "Revisionists" get short shrift. So, Appadorai's considered statements are wildly interpreted; my simple observations are oddly coloured by R.S.M.'s subjective reactions. I do not say this is deliberate. When the vision is everything, truth rides for a fall.

Yet, one may ask in passing, why the modest view that India's foreign policy is not a model for all need be turned into the idea that it is a limited policy "*valid only for herself*", and that Nehru is "without *any* desire" to urge it on other countries. When did Appadorai say anything so unsubtle? And why should the almost trite and innocent observation that the mediator is aided by the creation of a power equilibrium be transformed into the idea that Washington and Moscow balance power out of "goodwill and generosity" to India? I do not deal, I hope in such subjective wares. And why should the agreement of both West and East on a matter so obvious as the relationship between equilibrium and mediation be taken as sure proof that both are wrong? They both believe the world is round; does that oblige R.S.M. to believe that it is flat?

However, I am not at all sure that visions yield easily to rational argument. They are really in the province of psychology. And R.S.M.'s chief contribution may well be to warn us that international understanding is not only an exercise in rational dialogue. So, with that thought in mind, I wish to pursue my discussion with Appadorai, while remaining courteously aware that R.S.M. remains unpacified in our company, fearful lest we should damage the cause of international understanding by being too reasonable.

Idealism and Experience in International Politics

I feel that I should first throw light on a matter which is of considerable importance to our discussion, because I am responsible for having first cast a shadow over it. In my article, I stressed the importance given to the role of power in the maintenance of peace by Western analysts, in contrast to Indian emphasis on goodwill, conciliation and negotiation. I did so to bring out the fact that it is this distinctive element in Western thinking that keeps before us constantly the truth that social peace, nationally and universally, is essentially the by-product of a system of enforceable and changeable law; and that as long as such a system remains unestablished in world society true peace between states will elude us. On the other hand, I wanted also to bring out the corollary—that the different Indian emphasis seemed to encourage the illusion that no such system is really necessary, and that no substitute system, therefore, such as an organised balance of power, is necessary either, to create conditions under which policies of conciliation compromise, negotiation and so on can work to good effect.

However, now that the point has been made, and most reasonably received by Dr. Appadorai, it is timely for me to stress that I have done poor service to the truth concerning the whole liberal internationalist tradition of the West, and have therefore tended to hide the high degree of shared idealism that prevails between Western and Indian thinking on international relations. The truth is that my analysis of prevalent Western assumptions and attitudes today described a position arrived at very reluctantly, and much against

the grain of liberal thought. Such thinking did not come naturally or easily to persons nurtured in the tradition of British and American enlightened internationalism. As any reading, for example, of Beales' "History of Peace" will clearly show, that tradition has been manifestly idealistic. Its dynamic came from men and women who freely applied moral principles to political behaviour, nationally and internationally; and for whom "power politics" and the "Balance of Power" were ugly words for ugly phenomena. They wrote and spoke in much the same terms as are prevalent in India today. And this tradition lives on, enriched, not destroyed, by a greater appreciation of the role of lawful power in the maintenance of peace.

Hence, there is nothing in the most idealistic literature of India today on the virtues of peaceful behaviour, moral example, abnegation of power, conciliation, and so on, which surpasses the idealistic writings of those who have sustained, and still sustain, this long tradition in the West. And the same is true of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist writings, orations and action. Otherwise, how could one explain the fact that Nehru's moral appeal, his constant attempts to elevate the tone of international politics, and his championship of peaceful co-existence, bring a sympathetic and fully understanding response from so many people in the West, nurtured as they are in the same humanistic tradition? How explain the impact of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, with its direct moral appeal, its neutralism, and its protest against the politics of power balancing? How explain why our political leaders still defend or oppose every British action in the international field largely, though by no means exclusively, in moral terms? They know their public.

The truth is simply that Western experience of appeasement leading to war, of disarmament leading to the near victory of men of violence, and of pacifism, good-will, neutrality, and isolationism breaking up the forces of peace, so that events were shaped by men who loved force and hated humanism, had a profound effect on liberal internationalist thinking. It did not produce cynicism, or lack of faith in decent international behaviour, but it did lead to that distinctive emphasis on the need for strength behind the law, which I noted. Yet it is without enthusiasm that the consequences of this emphasis are endorsed. From the policies it leads to our people would dearly love to escape. If they could be convinced that peace could be promoted by other, happier policies alone, they would eagerly endorse them exclusively. Hence one sees the contrast between the cold, steady, unexcited support for NATO, for our uncompromisingly "realistic" disarmament policies, or for our cautious, non-appeasing "summitry", and the bursts of enthusiasm for humanitarian international causes and activities, whether in aid of refugees, or famine relief, or "war on want". In short, a frustrated desire to behave morally in an

immorally organised international society is the familiar, present condition of reflective British citizenry, and of other Western peoples.

So, one can say that the climate of both Indian and Western opinion, or certainly of British opinion, is permeated by the same idealistic concepts, the same aspirations, the same likes and dislikes. And from this I would briefly draw three conclusions:

First, in a dialogue of this kind, R.S.M. notwithstanding, we do not have to debate the superiority of love over hate, objectivity over partisanship, sincere negotiation over bullying threats, and so on. We are agreed here. And our most representative political leaders are too, though they react differently to different circumstances.

Secondly, this means paradoxically that British, American and Indian peoples can offend each other more deeply, if inadvertantly, than more cynical, power-loving peoples. Idealists, caught in a situation where they cannot practise their best behaviour, smart under the remotely delivered criticism of other idealists, who question whether they are really trying. It hurts even more when the suggestion is that they actually enjoy sinning, or are plainly ignorant of virtuous ways. Thus American preaching to Great Britain pre-1917, on the evils of imperialism and fighting wars, hurt the more because this country was, in fact, the spiritual home of Wilsonian idealism. In return, after the Second World War, a warm hearted and idealistic America smarted under criticisms from Europe and Asia, where her motives were inipugned; and, in retort, condemned her critics' policies as "immoral"; the choice of this word was no accident.

What should have happened was that when each nation—in this case, Britain first, then America, then India—became more and more involved in the realities of managing national security and international order, and became inevitably less able to base their every action on first ethical principles, they should have been drawn closer together—but a failure in public education led to them doubting each other's sincerity, and to attributing to a difference in moral standards what was really only a difference in experience.

(I suspect that this is a lesson R.S.M. has not fully grasped; otherwise he would not get himself into the self-righteous position of arguing that the Western democratic policy of defending the freedom of over two million West Berliners is somehow *less* morally defensible than India's role in Kashmir; and, also, of trying to find a difference in principle between India's firm refusal to barter territory to accommodate Chinese claims and the West's identical policy in respect of Soviet ambitions. No wonder he still encounters a "tremendous amount of criticism and antagonism" towards India's policies. If he expounds them so smugly, he invites trouble.)

Thirdly, following the above reference to differences of experience, I would predict with some certainty that Indian experience

in the post-war world will produce in the minds of India's most careful thinkers just the same change in attitude and understanding as Axis aggression and Soviet aggressiveness did in the minds of liberal Western internationalists. The ideals, the aspirations to behave peacefully and decently in international intercourse, the perpetual search for an escape from the necessity of balancing power, all will remain; but greater understanding of the role of power in the maintenance of peace will develop. Nevertheless, it would be disastrous if a series of unhappy experiences in international relations should wrest the moral leadership of India away from the kind of people who exert it today. I am suggesting only—but it is a large order, I admit—that Dr. Appadorai and his colleagues have a task on hand, and ahead, of getting opinion-forming circles in India to reassess some of their attitudes, so that they may wrestle more effectively with the real problems of evolving a better peace policy than any one, in Britain, America, or India, has yet propounded.

The Balance of Power

I was, therefore, rather disconcerted by the amount of space Dr. Appadorai gave to criticism of the Balance of Power, when this should now be beside the point. We have recognized that the West adopts a balance of power policy *faut de mieux*, fully aware of its inadequacy and dangers, and that in principle India does the same, when using power to prevent Pakistan or China from choosing other methods of settlement than negotiation, and that therefore both the West and India are jointly concerned with trying to replace the balance of power by something better. Why, then, argue any more about the merits and de-merits of the balance of power? It is a distraction from the real job in hand. And, in this case, it leads Dr. Appadorai into making generalisations which are to my mind only half truths—whose other halves bring confusion and loss of direction. For the sake of getting back on to the main track, may I take two or three of these?

- (i) The proposition that the Balance of Power is “outdated” by nuclear weapons. The truth is that it never was “in date” as a policy for maintaining permanent peace. Nuclear weapons have terribly demonstrated the need to find a better principle, because they have rendered total war “out of date”. But balancing will still go on, until the new principle is discovered and in effective operation, because there is no other policy than surrender. And we have agreed that surrender is not yet “in date” in the minds of Indians or Westerners.
- (ii) The proposition that “peace cannot be promoted by creating positions of strength”. This is plainly untrue. If a nation displays aggressive intentions against a neighbour,

and the neighbour displays enough strength to deter him, and obliges him to negotiate, then the creation of such a situation of strength has promoted peace. All history, including recent Indian history, bears this out. Of course power balancing *alone* does not promote peace in the long run, but we are agreed that both India and the West accompany it with the will to negotiate; and when there is promise of negotiating a just settlement, they do negotiate. (This is so obvious that I suspect that the phrase "positions of strength" has been given some special, subjective meaning in India. Does it mean more than an item in power balancing? When, say, the Indian Government sends forces to Kashmir, as a precautionary measure, is she doing something different from creating a "position of strength"? If so, there is a genuine misunderstanding here.)

- (iii) The proposition that "entering into military alliances and the establishment of military bases in foreign countries accentuates discord and the possibility of war". This cannot be so as a general principle, because there is no difference in principle between an alliance of states and a political union of states. The one cannot be more dangerous than the other. Why should the United States, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the "Union of States" that is the Republic of India, and the federation that makes up the People's Republic of China, and so on, all be allowed, without Dr. Appadorai's disapproval, to forge military fusions of power as single sovereign states, while smaller states be obliged to remain on their own, isolated and vulnerable, and be condemned as disturbers of the peace if they seek in pursuit of the same principle of community organisation, to organise voluntarily mutual facilities that strengthen collective bonds with friendly partners? Why this queer, legalistic distinction between a political union and a military alliance? Would the NATO system suddenly become less a cause of discord if, like Indian States, its members federated and became a single state? Surely the truth is that in an ungoverned world *all* sovereign states are a potential danger to peace, no less or more so than *all* alliances, and the need is to abolish both sets of phenomena at the same time to try and distinguish between the peace-upsetting qualities of each is to distract attention from this essential task—and to encourage an easy escape (by thinkers whose countries are alliances of states to begin with) into self-righteous isolationist thinking.

R.S.M. seeks such an escape, with his own rather Levitical touches to it. It leads him to extol Indian policy because he believes Nehru on principle only uses State power "for

self-defence conceived in the narrow sense of the term—e.g. as in Kashmir”. This seems to me a sad and unearned insult to Nehru. He at least knows that one cannot establish a world order if nations do not promise to defend—i.e. to help—one another. It may at times be hard to do so, but it is morally unworthy to stand aside when you can help. Collective security is written into the ideals of the United Nations, and it could hardly be otherwise in a world of self-respecting nations. If every state merely defends itself, we are even further back in the jungle than ever. The only argument here should be whether this community action of defending all states from aggression can best be arranged through power balancing alliances or through an international or supra-national world police force. And both the West and India know that the latter is preferable, and both are working to bring it about—indeed, as I shall suggest later, Mr. Nehru is making a very special and deliberate contribution here.

- (iv) The proposition that “discussion, negotiation and accommodation are the only ways left for the settlement of differences”. They *should* be, but they are not. Marxist-Leninists the world over encourage revolutionary wars and wars of liberation, and eschew “accommodation” (unless it is disguised victory for their side); nationalists have sprung to arms in every continent during the last decade, often with world-wide approval; and I would not regard it as impossible for Western Europeans to play dangerously with violent upheavals in Eastern Europe, if some internal breakdown were to unbalance power decisively there in favour of “liberators” of peoples under Communist rule. So, I would prefer to face the ugly facts of actual contemporary behaviour in international society, and let them rub home the lesson that the organisation of peace depends upon establishing a system of law enforcement that also provides for bringing about “peaceful change” according to generally accepted principles of justice. If there is no system of peaceful change within the Law, then there will be war even in a governed world order; unless, in despair, we accept the tyranny of World Empire.

An Indian-Russian dialogue?

Dr. Appadorai writes with insight on the essential spirit that makes for peaceful negotiation and settlement. I most certainly endorse all he says, but in this context I would like particularly to point out that deadlocks in negotiation—which both Western and Indian Governments have unhappily experienced—are very often caused by (a) the absence of common ideas of justice, of right and wrong behaviour, etc; and (b) by the subordination of

ideas of justice to considerations of power, when loss of power on one side might lead to even greater injustice. Especially when negotiating with the Communist Camp, the West has found the first mentioned cause a barrier to settlement of the first degree. We do not imagine this barrier and enjoy deadlock for its own sake. When one State sees an action as "liberation", and the other sees it as "enslavement"; when one sees a development as "progress", and the other as retrogression; when one side believes in advancing a new civilization through violence to victory, and the other, albeit very confusedly, believes in progress through "harmonisation of interests"; and so on—then, objectively viewed, the conditions for genuine peaceful settlement are just not there. You really have no standard by which to settle matters, no common law on which to rest an appeal to arbitration, and Khrushchev is right when he says "There are no neutral men". Even if agreement is patched up, inherent in the situation there is no guarantee, other than an effective distribution of deterrent power, that an agreement made today will be kept tomorrow.

Such a situation can only radically be changed when men's fundamental beliefs change; that is, when they reassess human behaviour and develop new ideas on how man's health, wealth and happiness can be promoted. This has happened in the case of many great, seemingly irreconcilable conflicts in history. The religious wars in Europe died away as a result of such a process. The "Peoples versus Thrones" ingredient of the conflict with France similarly died away in nineteenth century Europe. People just changed their minds on some fundamental questions. It will happen again. But it will happen faster if a really serious effort is made to discover exactly what assumptions have to be changed on one side or the other, or on both, to bring about a working agreement between them. And by "working agreement" I do not mean "co-existence" as defined by the 81 Communist Parties in Moscow last December. That is just a formula for violent and uncompromising striving after total victory at a lower level of conflict than total war. I mean sincere and harmonious living and collaborating together.

Here, it seems to me, is an opportunity for Indian scholars and others. It is, indeed, a difficult one to take. But surely there is now enough evidence of re-thinking going on in powerful and private circles in the Soviet Union and among its European associates for it not to be utopian to believe that serious, analytically sound, Indian thinking might have some effect upon it. Indian thinking has already affected Western re-thinking, and long may it continue to do so! I am not suggesting that only Communists need help in their efforts to understand man and his ways. But it is a striking fact that Russian Marxist-Leninists have been so far remarkably unaffected by Indian political thought, even though

one would think they are in dire need today of a breath of fresh air. Considering the intellectual weakness and tired staleness of much Marxist-Leninist thought on international society, Indian scholars certainly should not approach such an exchange of ideas and criticism with trepidation. They are well equipped for such a "dialogue". But they would have to go to Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, and elsewhere, and argue the whole issue out, fearlessly, without apology, point by point. Also, year in and year out.

Anyway, Western scholars have completely failed to establish any meeting of the minds with Marxist-Leninist leaders in Russia. What meetings have been held have been too haphazard, unprepared, and casual. They have been dogged by the cold war. Indians are in a much better position to try and bring Marxist-Leninism to earth, because they start from a position of non-alignment. The fact that they would also be helping the West to get some of its ideas straight should prevent the intrusion of any wounding assumptions that only Marxist-Leninism blocks the way to world harmony.

World Government or What?

I agree with so much that Dr. Appadorai writes, especially in relation to the need to build peace through the removal of political, economic, and social injustice, that I am loathe to end on a further question of disagreement. But the value of a discussion is not enhanced by passing over disagreements, and this one is of considerable importance. It is, perhaps, a disappointment rather than an outright disagreement. It is that Dr. Appadorai seems uninterested in exploring the whole question of an alternative principle to the balance of power. As I have said earlier, we can only destroy the dangerous and inadequate power balancing system of restraining war by replacing it with a better one. That is, with a better system of power distribution in the service of a just rule of law. We both acknowledge the place that power plays in maintaining peace in all political societies, and, therefore, that negotiation, mediation, and conciliation are not alternatives to the balance of power. They are peacemaking activities that take place within a system of power distribution that, if properly organised, gives them life and opportunity. The balance of power frustrates them, even though it badly needs them even to work itself.

Anyone, therefore, who stands for the rejection of the balance of power is under some obligation—and a practical challenge—to spell out clearly what other principle he is working to establish in international society. Now, there are not many available. I know of three; and am wondering whether there is a fourth. First, there is harmonious anarchy, which no multi-group political society has ever achieved. Secondly, there is World Empire, where power is centralised on the autocratic principle. This would bring peace,

and it may well be what we will eventually get, for want of something better. "Peace at any price" is the formula for bringing it into operation. But at the moment it is not worth discussing, as the road to it runs through war.

Thirdly, there is Democratic World Federal Government, where power in world society is centralised on the democratic principle. It is this which, in a vague, unenthusiastic way—if only to make their proposals ultimately logical—the West has endorsed in principle. The Western Disarmament plans stand by their super-national provisions (i.e. for a World Authority wielding an International Police Force in a disarmed world). Although these and other Western plans endorse the principle of democratic world federalism, they are put forward without public discussion, and almost without hope. However, the West's leaders do at least know that they are tied to working the balance of power system for ever, if they do not make progress towards this goal.

The trouble is that the prospects of establishing genuine world government are so remote that many people believe that this is a good reason for not discussing the goal. Perhaps Dr. Appadorai feels this way. But this is an unsound argument. For, without a stated goal, how can one chart progress? How can one say that any particular policy is promoting peace, when one has no clear idea of what the real condition of peace in this world really is? How can one work to destroy the need for a balance of power, without knowing what it is you are trying to put in its place? One may just be opening the road to something worse; indeed, if my analysis is correct, one would be opening the road to inharmonious anarchy or World Empire. To deny one wanted such results would be no excuse. Every purposeless nail in the coffin of the balance of power is, objectively viewed, a contribution to anarchy or empire.

So, one has got to make up one's mind on this. And, having done so, to judge every peace policy by the simple standard: does it, or does it not, promote the chosen goal?

Western thinking on this question is rather dead and tired. Men in the West saw the point so long ago, espoused the cause of world government of some kind so actively, with so little success, so often, that they have apparently nothing more to say. What we need from Indian thinkers and experienced statesmen is not silence on this question, but new ideas on it, exciting initiatives and a bit of encouraging faith and determination—based on sound analysis, of course, and not upon woolly utopianism, of which the West has supplied enough.

My view is that the world may get through to some kind of peace without something quite so tidy as classical concepts of Democratic World Federal Government. In other words, there may be some kind of Fourth Way,—between completely centralised government

and mere present anarchy, and part autocratic, part democratic. Perfectionist plans ring untrue to me at times. But we shall not get anything of value without consciously striving for some form of world management. Furthermore, it would seem now that the logic of the situation reached in disarmament discussions, and in other fields of East-West negotiation, whenever we try to achieve some kind of an international settlement that depends on inspection, control, impartial administration, and international guarantees, is making the Western Powers and the Soviet Union think seriously about this problem. Even Mr. Khrushchev's seemingly negative ideas on Triumvirates, which he now advances in several different contexts, indicate that he is thinking seriously about the implications of Western world governmental ideas—perhaps more seriously than the Western governments and peoples themselves.

Nehru's Initiatives

If there is a Fourth Way, I believe that the United Nations will prove to be its most likely growing point, and the deeds, even more than the words, of the Asian and African members will soon show which way things are likely to develop. I am impressed by the way Mr. Nehru has thrown the power of his nation into the world political arena, so that he is helping to preserve world law and order, like any world power, yet with a difference. His forces are spread from Egypt to the Congo. Each time he has moved them in response to an internationally authorised request. But they have moved—that is the point. They have pretty well saved the day in the Congo. Moreover, Nehru has not refused the request, even when it has offended a world power; nor even when it has offended other Afro-Asian powers. In the Congo he showed that non-alignment did not preclude him from using Indian power where Russia wanted no outside power used. And in the Congo he defied the criticisms of the African "Casablanca" group of States, because in his judgment their policies would not have led to law and order, or to real justice of any kind on the spot.

Is there no strategy of peace behind this? Is it all *ad hoc*? I cannot believe so. It seems to me that Nehru is very cautiously, and with strict control so far over Indian sovereignty, seeking to establish a series of successful precedents, procedures, and instruments for their further application, which will eventually add up to the creation of a readily available source of real military and political power in the service not of any power bloc, nor of any properly established representative world government, nor yet capable of being blocked by any one power group, and which, thereby, is bit by bit managing to work to maintain peace on a world scale—in the interests of the whole of international society. In other words, he is creating a new distribution of world power, which will modify the need for a balance of power—first, in specified areas, and

eventually, if he can get nations to work with him to tidy the whole process up and give it constitutional precision, over the whole world.

Vague? Untidy? Yes. But the time for precision has not yet come. And untidiness is inherent in a situation where the world is passing through a profound social and political revolution, which has not yet worked its way out. New forces are emerging that are not yet ready to play their part in peace management; their leaders have been preoccupied by nationalist struggles, and by the need to stabilise their own countries before putting the world in order; India has had many years start—but could easily have gone isolationist or set out to encourage irresponsibility the world over; we must be grateful for the way Nehru has used these years, and for the example he has here set. Moreover, his colleagues in this work for world peace have been chosen by the events of history, not by himself: Nasser, Sukarno, Tito, and whoever emerges to equivalent status in Africa, and Latin America, may not prove to be ideal partners. Yet, they are not unpromising ones. Can they both hold together and learn to judge every crisis situation wisely, when they are obliged to work in the old balance of power society, while trying to reform it? It is a very difficult task. More difficult still is the cost of sustaining it. Can they stand the economic strain of world-wide policing, which is normally carried out by rich States in their own interests?

I do not know the answer. We must make a more precise analysis of exactly what they are doing, and of the kind of international order they seem to be envisaging. But I think it is well worth careful examination and discussion. And it is in this field that I believe that Indian, as well as other scholars in the African, Asian, and Latin American world, could make a fresh, and ultimately beneficial contribution to the problem of how to progress from a peace uncertainly resting on a balance of power to one that gives us all better opportunities to live decently, and to pay more than lip service to the humane and civilized forms of international conduct that Dr. Appadorai so excellently espouses.

ALAN DE RUSSETT

NEUTRAL MEN AND NEUTRAL ACTION

A. M. JAMES

ONE of the interesting and important international developments of the past decade has been the increasingly significant role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Recent events indicate, however, that the present incumbent* has probably passed the zenith of his political usefulness to the Organization and it seems that, like his predecessor, Trygve Lie, he will spend his last two years of office in a state of official non-existence as far as the Soviet Union and its friends are concerned. For, following the death, in the Congo, of Mr. Lumumba, the Soviet Union announced that it was not going to maintain relations with Mr. Hammarskjöld or recognize him in future as a U.N. official, a position which marked the culmination of Soviet dissatisfaction with the way in which the U.N. was acting in the Congo. This dissatisfaction had previously found expression in its proposal at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly that for the single Secretary-General there be substituted a three-man executive. This proposal, the Secretary-General's rejoinder, and other comments which have been made on it have raised an important question concerning the most profitable role which the Secretary-General, and therefore the Organization itself, might play in a world in which the relations of the sovereign states who make up the United Nations are notable more for discord than unity.

Mr. Khrushchev's proposal that the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations be abolished, and that in its place be established a committee of three men, only acting when all three were agreed, is based on the contention that "while there are neutral states there are not—nor can there be—neutral men".¹ He has said on a number of occasions since he first made the proposal in September 1960 at the Session of the U.N. General Assembly which had just begun, that it is impossible to find a man who can be expected to represent the interests of the three groups of states into which he sees the world as being divided: states belonging to the Western military alliance system, neutralist, and communist states. This is so, it is argued, because no one can fail to be influenced by the ideology which prevails in the society in which he lives, which has the result that, when faced with an international event or a social system, any man's view of it will be a view which, to those who have imbibed a different ideology, will appear biased. If, therefore, one man is charged with the final responsibility for administering an institution and executing the decisions of its policy-making bodies it is to be expected that he will act in a manner which will incur the hostility of one or more groups of states, whose interests he will be charged with having ignored or injured. This,

*This article was written before the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld.

¹ *Soviet News*, 13 June 1961.

in Mr. Khrushchev's view has happened in the case of the United Nations, whose Secretary-General has been furthering the interests of the Western Powers and harming those of the communist states, as has been made particularly plain, so the allegation runs, in the case of the Congo. Accordingly, Mr. Hammarskjöld must resign, but it will be insufficient to replace him with another individual, even a national of a neutral state, for such a man, in common with all other men, cannot represent the interests of three groups of states, and would therefore provide no guarantee that he would be able to take up an impartial position so far as the interests of any one group were concerned. Mr. Khrushchev consequently contends that the only way of assuring the continued existence of the U.N. in its present form is for its Secretariat to be headed by a veto-bound committee of three men, one drawn from, and representing the interests of, each of the three mentioned groups of states. This would allow all three groups to have confidence in the working of the U.N., and also to help to preserve peace for such an executive structure would ensure that peace was not threatened by the U.N. taking action which was detrimental to any group.

The threat which Mr. Khrushchev's troika proposal posed to the idea of a Secretary-General forming part of an independent, international civil service, and often politically active in the interests of the U.N., quickly evoked support for that concept. To the fore in the fray was Mr. Hammarskjöld himself: Mr. Khrushchev first made his troika proposal on a Friday; the meeting of the General Assembly held on the following Monday morning opened with a statement from the Secretary-General. He said that the question which had been raised concerned not a man but an office, and that criticism of the Secretary-General in consequence of his endeavour to be impartial strikes at his office. "I would rather see that office break on strict adherence to the principle of independence, impartiality and objectivity than drift on the basis of compromise".² He went on to defend his view of his office, and elaborated his position on this question at a lecture given at Oxford in the following May. There he emphasized his belief that the U.N. Secretary-General, on account of the conception of his office embodied in the Charter, has the right to play an independent, international role. Although it will sometimes lead to his involvement in political conflict, this will not indicate a lack of neutrality provided that he is "wholly uninfluenced by national or group interests or ideologies".³ "The international civil servant must keep himself under the strictest observation. He is not requested to be a neuter in the sense that he has to have no sympathies or antipathies, that there are to

² U.N. General Assembly, Official Record. (G.A.O.R.) 871st Plenary Meeting, paragraph 9.

³ Dag Hammarskjöld: *The International Civil Servant in Law and Fact* (1961), p. 14.

be no interests which are close to him in his personal capacity or that he is to have no ideas or ideals that matter for him. However, he is requested to be fully aware of those human reactions and meticulously check himself so that they are not permitted to influence his actions".⁴ "I would say", he has been quoted as saying, "there is no neutral man, but there is, if you have integrity, neutral action by the right kind of man".⁵

That the Secretary-General is capable of neutral action of this nature is, as the General Debate at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly showed, widely believed. The Iraqi delegate for example, while supporting the Soviet position on colonialism and disarmament, said that he associated himself "with the wide expression of confidence in the ability of the Secretary-General, his impartiality and his devotion to the cause of peace and freedom everywhere".⁶ Mr. Khrushchev, however, has made it clear that he is not interested in the reputation of Mr. Hammarskjöld, or of anyone else, for impartiality. His is an attack which does not necessarily impugn the motives, the good faith of the Secretary-General. Such an official may act conscientiously, but "we cannot rely on the conscience of the Secretary-General, because everyone has his own view on conscience, his own understanding of ethics".⁷ What matters is the, to use a word much favoured in communist terminology, "objective" position, and not the subjective reactions of a conscience moulded by its environment. And, objectively, Mr. Hammarskjöld is "a Swede by birth, but in his political views he is a representative of the monopoly capital of the United States of America, and he serves the United States".⁸ The Soviet Union would have no objection to him serving at the top of the U.N. Secretariat if he were accompanied by two others, representing the neutralist and communist states, in accordance with the troika principle. But he is no longer acceptable as Secretary-General as the office is at present constituted.

Western indignation at the Soviet allegation and proposal should not obscure the fact that there are two separate issues here, and that Messrs. Khrushchev and Hammarskjöld are not talking about the same one. The Secretary-General has taken his stand on the basis of the possibility of individual integrity. He has pointed out that a man, when acting in an official capacity, can put his own prejudices on one side, and act impartially: his motives can be pure and his conscience clear. Chairman Khrushchev's reply amounts to saying that he is interested not in motives but in effects, that his concern is aroused when an act harms the interests of his country, irrespective of the reasons which led to it. Here, it is thought, is a

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵ *New York Times*, 22 June 1961.

⁶ G.A.O.R. 890th Plenary Meeting, paragraph 42.

⁷ N. S. Khrushchev: *Disarmament and Colonial Freedom* (1961), p. 105

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

distinction of some substance, for the whole point of doing something is to influence the situation in question, and it is rarely that all those interested in it are equally pleased by the change which an action produces. An example used by Mr. Hammarskjöld in his Oxford lecture makes this point clear. In support of his argument that it is not unusual to require of a man that he put his personal prejudices on one side when acting in his official capacity he referred to a judge as one who is under this obligation. But this does not mean that judicial activity is devoid of an effect on the situation. Quite the contrary, for it is in the nature of a judgment to influence the situation to which it refers, and in a way which, from the point of view of one of the parties to the case, is unsatisfactory. The activity in which the U.N. Secretary-General engages is far from being judicial in nature, even if the temper which both bring to their work is similar. But it has the same sort of effect in that, when he is attending to other than internal administrative matters, his activity may fail to receive equal acclaim from all the Organization's members. In short, men may act in a manner which to the best of their endeavours and belief, is impartial, but action which is, in this sense, neutral, is not necessarily neutral in its effects: someone is likely to feel that he has been adversely affected.

When this occurs the member who feels that action taken in the name of the U.N. has done him an injury is unlikely to keep quiet about it. Quite a lot may be heard about the iniquity of the action and about the impropriety of the institution having moved in that way. Should the offending act have been taken directly in pursuance of a decision of one of the policy-making organs of the institution, acting by majority vote, the case may be seen as yet another example of one's competitors on the international stage behaving with the perfidy which one has come to expect of them. But should immediate responsibility for it seem to lie at the door of the institution's chief administrative or executive officer, he having interpreted an imprecise resolution of the General Assembly or Security Council, or having acted in the absence of specific instructions and on the basis of the general authority inherent in his office, the onslaught may be particularly bitter. It is quite possible that the action will be interpreted as an outrageous instance of an individual who is employed by the institution to serve it impartially acting in a manner which, by having a detrimental effect on one's position, is obviously a violation of the independent international standpoint which he is supposed to adopt. This was the charge which Mr. Lie faced on a number of occasions, a charge made not only by the communist countries. The frequency with which he met it was a sign that here was a Secretary-General who was less valuable to the U.N. than he might have been. One who is often in the centre of political controversy, even if not always on the same side, is not a person who is regularly sought out as a political con-

fessor and adviser, and the unsolicited opinions of such an individual are not likely to be regarded as having great authority. Mr. Hammarskjöld, succeeding Mr. Lie, took a more cautious line in his dealings and utterances, and, accordingly, was able to build up his political weight to a not inconsiderable extent. So much so that criticisms of his activities have been few, and, until recently, couched in limited terms. His support, in the Spring of 1958, for an American plan for an inspection force in the Arctic produced no stronger Soviet reaction than the statement that it didn't strengthen the Secretary-General's authority. In November of the following year his decision to visit Laos in order to assess for himself the troubled situation there, which was thought by some to be in part due to support for dissident Laotians from North Vietnam, evoked strong communist criticism, but the Soviet Union made it plain that it was to be regarded as having application only to his action in this question. It was not until the U.N. representatives in the Congo, whose instructions from the Security Council and General Assembly were couched in vague terms, refused to try to keep the Soviet-favoured Mr. Lumumba in power, that the Soviet Union decided that the time had come to cast the die: to charge Mr. Hammarskjöld with a general lack of impartiality, and to propose a radical change in the nature of the office of Secretary-General.

To dismiss this incident as another instance of Soviet perversity, which should be exposed as the reactionary trouble-making that it is, and which should be used as an occasion for rallying opinion behind the more enlightened and progressive attitude towards the role of the U.N. which the West claims to hold, is to give the Soviet proposal less than its full significance. For it reflects the nature of the society of sovereign states, and it is the character of that society which sets the limits within which an Organization such as the U.N., with an almost universal membership, has to function. The West may honestly feel that the Soviet attitude to the U.N., as revealed in its troika proposal, is quite uncalled for, and should be wholeheartedly condemned. But that does not alter the fact that that attitude is not necessarily going to alter just because the West thinks badly of it, nor even if the Western states are joined in this by the neutralists. It is something which has to be lived with, and which is going to have an influence on the future role of the U.N. It is therefore well to avoid fulminations and to recognize that what the troika idea expresses is the fact that the Soviet Union, like other states, is not prepared to suffer adversity and say or do nothing about it, especially when the reverse to its interests is a consequence of action by a body of which it is a member.

This raises an important question concerning the role of the U.N. The pre-requisite for executive or operational action is, usually, a united policy-making body. There is then a source of precise instructions and, when necessary, authoritative interpretations of

those instructions. The executive arm is thus enabled to give its whole attention to the job in hand, undisturbed from behind. Internationally, however, given the absence of a readiness, or any likelihood of a readiness, on the part of states to accept adverse effects in the interests of the whole, the U.N. does not find itself in this position when it assumes the executive mantle. Executive activity on its part, whatever its consequences for the external matter to which it gives attention, may lead to strife within, reopening the divisions which are inherent in the U.N. on account of its membership reflecting the divisions of the world. The result may be an Organization which, even if none of its members leave or boycott it, may be less well fitted in future to do anything. The question therefore arises whether it is advisable for the U.N. to conceive itself as an institution which should be very ready to become operationally involved in contentious political issues. It is not likely that its members are going to thrust into the lap of the Organization all sorts of difficult problems, and leave it to get on with them. Nor on the other hand, is it likely that the U.N. will entirely be able to avoid executive involvement in international politics, even if it was thought that this was desirable. But between these two extremes a variety of positions are possible, and the issue raised here concerns the degree of emphasis which should be placed upon the operational activity of the U.N. Should the Organization, on account of the likely division of opinion as to the nature of its executive excursions, and because of the acrimony to which such activity may give rise in consequence of its unneutral effects, regard this type of role as the exception rather than the rule, and concentrate upon what is often called the moral pressure of public debate and resolve, and on the quiet reconciling of members' policies? This would call for a Secretariat which kept largely in the background, and would lead to relatively few examples of the U.N. "presence" at world trouble spots. Or should it incline towards a more positive role, one which, within the U.N., would require "bold and consistent leadership" from the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, who would "seek less to please and to defer to the Assembly, its councils and committees, than to assist them with mature analysis, with unambiguous proposals, and with critical appraisals of less adequate alternatives".⁹ Such a part would not stop at a lively espousal by the Secretariat and/or a majority of members of what was thought by them to be, on any issue, the "international" view, but would involve, where appropriate, the sending forth of U.N. missions, large or small, civil or military, to implement the Organization's policy, such physical activity being regarded as a sign of the authority of the collectivity of states, of the world community.

Emphasis on this latter type of role is not a necessary consequ-

⁹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: *The United Nations Secretariat* (1950), p. 30.

ence of opposition to Mr. Khrushchev's troika proposal: its rejection could be allied with a recognition that there is a limit to what can profitably be done in the name of a body which is not united, and such a recognition might assist in obviating the Soviet clamour for a troika at the head of the U.N. Secretariat. But the response of a number of states and commentators, and also of the Secretary-General, has been to stress the U.N.'s operational potentialities. Mr. Diefenbaker of Canada did not wish to see the power of the U.N. "to proceed effectively and promptly in emergencies"¹⁰ neutralized. The representative of Thailand wanted to strengthen the authority of the Secretary-General so that the U.N. would be better able to "intervene between two opposing groups".¹¹ Mr. Macmillan lamented Mr. Khrushchev's endeavour to "reduce the power of the Organization to deal with crises".¹² Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand saw the U.N. as "the defender of international peace and security"¹³ and said that it would fail in this task if the Soviet proposal was accepted. The representatives of Laos and Cameroon, coming to the Secretary-General's support, said that they looked to the U.N. for protection.¹⁴ Sir Hugh Foot, now British representative in the Trusteeship Council, said in his 1961 Ramsay Muir Memorial Lecture that the new states, now making up almost half of U.N. membership, have "a firm faith in the need for an effective and powerful United Nations organization",¹⁵ and Max Frankel has reported that "most members" want the U.N. "to develop a separate international personality to promote the order and peaceful settlements periodically demanded by a majority".¹⁶

Many of the commentators, likewise, when writing of the troika proposal in the context of the U.N., have clearly been basing their views on the premise that the U.N. is, and ought to remain, an operating agency of some significance. William R. Frye wrote that "the Secretary-General with a peace force at his disposal has become the principal operating organ of the world organization", and saw Mr. Khrushchev's proposal as an effort to destroy the U.N. "as an effective peacemaking instrument".¹⁷ The *New York Herald Tribune's* view was that "It is quite clear that if the United Nations is to function at all, it must be more than a debating society. If it is to channel economic and technical assistance, serve as a police force, stand watch over troubled areas, it must have effective administration and be able to take swift action. It is

¹⁰ G.A.O.R. 871st Plenary Meeting, paragraph 181.

¹¹ G.A.O.R. 874th Plenary Meeting, paragraph 16.

¹² G.A.O.R. 877th Plenary Meeting, paragraph 89.

¹³ G.A.O.R. 886th Plenary Meeting, paragraph 72.

¹⁴ See G.A.O.R. 904th Plenary Meeting.

¹⁵ *The Times*, 7 August 1961.

¹⁶ *New York Times*, 22 June 1961.

¹⁷ *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 September 1960.

equally clear that it cannot do so without offending some groups, some nations, in the process The Soviet argument is, quite simply, a prescription for paralysis. And the world cannot afford paralysis in the United Nations".¹⁸ Mr. Lippman's opinion of the role of the U.N. and, in particular, of the Secretary-General, has appeared in a reference to "the emergence of the office of Secretary-General under Mr. Hammarskjöld's brilliant direction as an indispensable protector of the peace among small nations".¹⁹ A somewhat similar standpoint was later adopted by the *Guardian*: "In the long run a strong United Nations offers the only hope of independence for weak countries anxious to prevent themselves from being swallowed up in the cold war".²⁰ Mr. Patrick O'Donovan, of the *Observer* has concluded, albeit cautiously, as he was speaking at an early stage of the Congo operation, that it has shown that "we no longer have to depend *only* on that precarious truce between Washington and Moscow, that there is another way in which we could conceivably get things done".²¹ An academic observer, a French professor of international organization, has written that: "If the proposal of the Soviet Union should come into effect, the United Nations would be reduced to little more than a forum for the discussion of international problems and a platform for appeal to public opinion", having earlier referred to the Secretary-General as having "turned into an indispensable instrument for implementing the decisions of the Security Council and, particularly, of the General Assembly".²²

With this belief that the U.N. is an indispensable peacemaking agency, that it has a positive, independent role to play, the Secretary-General has concurred. A reiteration by Mr. Khrushchev of his troika proposal elicited a public reply from Mr. Hammarskjöld at the General Assembly's next meeting when he said: "A weak or non-existent executive would mean that the United Nations would no longer be able to serve as an effective instrument for the active protection of the interests of those Members who need such protection".²³ Speaking later in the administrative and Budgetary Committee he said that if the Soviet proposal was accepted "The United Nations Organization would be reduced to the role of a framework for public multilateral negotiations and robbed of its possibilities of action in the preservation of peace".²⁴ At Oxford in May 1961 his warnings were even more sombre. Acceptance of a troika along the lines suggested by the Soviet Union might "well

¹⁸ European edition, 27 September 1960.

¹⁹ *New York Herald Tribune* (European edition), 8 October 1960.

²⁰ 29 June 1961.

²¹ "The Precedent of the Congo", in *International Affairs*, April 1961, p. 188.

²² Michel Virally, "Vers une Reforme du Secretariat des Nations Unies?" (English abstract), *International Organization*, Spring 1961, p. 225.

²³ G.A.O.R. 883rd Plenary Meeting, paragraph 9.

²⁴ *New York Times*, 19 October 1960.

prove to be the Munich of international co-operation as conceived after the First World War and further developed under the impression of the tragedy of the Second World War. To abandon or to compromise with principles on which co-operation is built may be no less dangerous than to compromise with principles regarding the rights of a nation. In both cases the price to be paid may be peace".²⁵

The conception of the U.N.'s role which this assessment reveals is more ambitious and significant than that which the second Secretary-General has previously appeared to hold. His reaction to the troika proposal has also revealed that he has altered his view concerning the conditions which will lead him to relinquish his office. At the time of the Suez crisis, and when, two years later, he announced his determination to act on his own to develop the U.N. effort in the Middle Eastern crisis, he told the Security Council that if it disapproved of his attitude and action it should ask him to resign, and that he would do so. His position seemed to be that he regarded himself as requiring the confidence of all the permanent members of the Security Council, and that if it was not forthcoming he would make way for someone who could command it. Now, however, his attitude is quite different. Addressing the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly after the Soviet Union had called upon him to resign, he said: "By resigning I would . . . at the present difficult and dangerous juncture throw the Organization to the winds. I have no right to do so because I have a responsibility to all those Member States for which the Organization is of decisive importance—a responsibility which over-rides all other considerations. It is not the Soviet Union or indeed any of the other big Powers which need the United Nations for their protection. It is all the others. In this sense the Organization is first of all their Organization and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be able to use and guide it. I shall remain in my post during the term of office as a servant of the Organization in the interest of all those other nations as long as they wish me to do so".²⁶

The picture of a U.N. quelling crises, keeping the peace, preserving the innocent weak from the wiles of those who combine wickedness and strength makes a wide appeal outside the communist bloc. Hence it rallies support against Mr. Khrushchev's troika idea, because, if that idea was implemented, it would so obviously make possible the paralysis of the Organization at the will of the communist representative, it being assumed that a desire to have the ability to paralyse the organization is behind the proposal. The picture is particularly appealing because there is a widespread feeling that the U.N. ought to be capable of doing things at a time of crisis, and not merely when all its important members are agreed,

²⁵ Hammarskjöld, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

²⁶ G.A.O.R. 883rd Plenary Meeting, paragraphs 10-11.

or when the issue is not a significant one. References to the Organizations's "talk" are often prefaced by the pejorative "just", or "only". The implication is that it is somehow unworthy for the U.N. in contentious matters solely to debate, discuss, and engage, through its officials, in discreet diplomacy. It should be marked by action. Mankind wishes to assert itself, and the appropriate vehicle for this is the U.N. The Congo operation is seen as crucial in this respect: if the Organization can emerge from it with the feeling that it has done a good job, then it will have gained the necessary impetus, it will have taken the first step towards attaining its "true" stature. But if it is generally felt to have failed, then it will have passed its zenith, and be on the way down to the status of a palatial but inconsequential tea shop. At this point in the analysis the spectre of Geneva is often invoked: if the pattern of U.N. action which has emerged over the last few years is now rejected, the result will be, the Secretary-General has admonished, that the U.N. will "fall back on the pattern of the League of Nations".²⁷

This urge towards action is understandable. The U.N. design for the enforcement of collective security, the imposing Chapter Seven of the Charter, has not progressed beyond the stage of print and paper, for, as the British Government observed in its 1945 commentary on this aspect of the Charter, "the successful working of the United Nations depends on the preservation of the unanimity of the Great Powers".²⁸ The imprecations of the General Assembly in the Hungarian crisis had no noticeable effect on the course of Soviet policy, and this, no doubt, made some realize that the greater apparent success which attended its condemnation of Britain and France at the same time was not entirely due to the voice of the Organization. That the U.N. may not only be impotent with regard to large states has been made clear in 1961 by the refusals of South Africa and Portugal to allow U.N. missions to visit, respectively, South West Africa and Angola. In these and like issues there are plenty of reasons for frustration, ample cause for members, especially those of the smaller ones who are not militarily aligned, to feel that sometimes, we, the U.N., must be able to do something. The Organization must show that it is alive, a force to be reckoned with, a factor in the situation. Nor are the larger Western states obviously anxious to oppose this desire. Already embarrassed by the colonial backsliders in their ranks, they are not likely to want to offend the uncommitted states more than is necessary. And it is quite possible that it will not be necessary for them to do this. For the type of non-economic operational activity in which the U.N. is most likely to engage concerns situations where a state thinks that it is subject to a threat from outside, direct or indirect, and feels

²⁷ *New York Times*, 19 October 1960.

²⁸ Cmd. 6666, p. 17.

that it would be valuable for it to have physical evidence of the interest of the U.N. in its fate, whether that interest takes the form of anything from, at the one extreme, a visit from the Secretary-General or the sending of a small mission, to, at the other, the despatch of a para-military force on the Suez or Congo pattern. This is the sort of situation in which the West may well find itself sympathetic towards the predicament of the state making the request, for it is probably happier with most situations as they are than as they are likely to be after a period of turbulence: it does not regard itself as most likely to be the most successful fisher in troubled waters. Many other members, particularly the large company of those who, both small and uncommitted, would be mindful of their own possible needs in this respect at a later date, are also likely to be sympathetically disposed towards any such request. So that, seeing the cause of internationalism walking hand in hand with narrower, prudential considerations, a majority of members approve of the concept of an operational U.N., one ready, willing and anxious to take a hand in important political matters.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has evidently concluded that this is not the sort of U.N. which will secure its needs. This, too, is understandable. It has not the same general interest in stability as has the West, believing that instability is likely to lead to results beneficial to the communist cause. And even where a U.N. intervention may seem, from its point of view, to be useful, it is aware that it is unlikely to be able to control the action by getting its point of view accepted by the Security Council or General Assembly, and that an independent Secretary-General, interpreting vague resolutions or acting on his own initiative, may, however honestly he acts, do so in a manner which on account of his conception of the interests of the U.N. being at variance with those of the Soviet Union, will be far less neutral in its effects than in its motivation.

To suggest that the U.N., that is, the majority of its members, give up the concept of an operational Organization in deference to the views of the Soviet Union would probably produce from many of them the response that this would be a shabby example of Munich-like appeasement, and a betrayal of mankind's interest in peace, which can best be safeguarded by an active U.N. But for the majority of the Organization's members to regard it as something to be fashioned after their own image of it may do it no great good. As the Soviet Union and its friends find the U.N. a very valuable forum they are unlikely to leave or boycott it, especially as the communist government of China is now not far from obtaining a seat. But some of the criticisms which they make regarding the impropriety of the Organization being used in a manner which a significant minority strongly opposes have at least an element of plausibility, and may therefore find, in some quarters, a receptive

audience. A number of neutralist states might, in consequence, reconsider their attitude towards the U.N.'s activities, and also towards the West. Also, refusal on the part of some members to have anything to do with U.N. operations will certainly bring about financial difficulties for the Organization, as has already happened,²⁹ and might encourage others to treat their financial obligations in a cavalier way. Further, vilification of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General as agents of Western imperialism, however unjust, is not best calculated to keep them in good morale. Mr. Lie was not at all happy during his later days at New York, when the Soviet Union refused to have anything to do with him. Mr. Hammarskjöld may be less sensitive, but at least one report from a Western correspondent at the U.N. since the Soviet demand for his resignation has not been encouraging in this respect, saying that the Secretary-General "is cracking intermittently under the strain. He now often talks of failure which he would not hitherto contemplate or countenance".³⁰

The possibility of further developments of this nature prompts the question: are the majority of members proceeding on a well conceived course in envisaging the U.N. as an institution which does well to engage in operational activities whenever there is a chance of doing so? The implication behind this question is not that a U.N. reconciled to a less active life than the one in which many of its members would at present like it to engage would be filled with sweetness and light. But it is thought that there is a significant difference between the degrees of heat which are likely to be generated in an Organization which, against the wishes and interests of an important group of its members, is trying to take a hand of its own in international politics, and one which deliberately shuns that type of involvement, the members of which, so far as contentious political issues are concerned, usually confine themselves to trying to win the support of most of their fellow members for their policy, or, at least, try to avoid condemnation by the Organization. It is thought possible that an Organization of the latter type might be able to exert a greater conciliatory influence in inflamed situations than one operating on the former pattern.

Perhaps the most significant development in the field of universal international organization since the Second World War has been the growth of what is often called the moral authority of the U.N. Virtually all states are anxious to be in the Organization, and all of its members are concerned about the view it will formally take on matters which concern them. That view, however widely held, will not, on its own, deflect a state set upon a particular course. But in situations in which the states concerned are able to feel that a more

²⁹ See "Must United Nations Go Bankrupt?", *The Times*, 11 August 1961.

³⁰ *Observer Foreign News Service*, No. 16499, 22 December 1960.

flexible policy is open to them, the voice of the Organization may have an influence on the situation in the direction of the lessening of tension, by both leading the parties to the dispute to the view that this would be the course of prudence and enabling them to move in that way without too much loss of face. That the U.N. is sometimes able to do this is largely due, on the one hand, to its almost universal membership, which has provided a basis for the claim that when it speaks one is hearing the voice of mankind, of world public opinion, or at least of the society of sovereign states, and, on the other, to the widespread reluctance on the part of states to behave in ways that might be thought to be contemptuous of what is generally deemed to be that voice. France, for example while very disdainful of the U.N., has been reported as finding the possibility of a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the dispute between it and Tunis over Bizerta, as "highly embarrassing".³¹ The "deeming" is of the essence here. No one can show, as in a laboratory, what, "truly", the opinions of mankind are, or where, "authentically", they are to be heard. It is a question of the assumption on which one works, the hypothesis which one adopts, and the readiness of states to make a supposition in this matter which favours the resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly is likely to be less if that body is glaringly divided regarding the role which the U.N. should play.

It might be thought that a vague influence in the direction of conciliation, probably exerted successfully only occasionally, and, in relation to the most important international disputes, usually only marginally, is an advantage insufficient to outweigh the loss which would be suffered by putting on one side the concept of an operational U.N. In this view, if the U.N. cannot get the best of both worlds, the espousal of the operational concept would be worth the problems and quarrels which would attend a divided U.N. acting as if it were united; it might even be worth the break-up of the Organization as it now is with the result that it would become more united but less universal, it seems that it would be difficult for the U.N. to encompass, in future, both the mentioned roles. The contrast between them would, in practice, be less than it looks when they are opposed on paper, as the opportunities open to the U.N. to become operationally involved in matters of some political moment are not abundant, and it is not suggested that the less active role is one which would lead to the U.N. never emerging from its Headquarters if there was a whiff of controversy in the air. But the Congo operation has raised a question which has been latent since the end of the Korean war, and has shown that considerable obstacles lie in the way of an endeavour to combine the two roles. The troika issue, which the operation has precipitated, makes it most unlikely that until these obstacles are once again met the U.N.

³¹ *The Times*, 1 August 1961.

will be able to proceed on its way as if nothing has happened. So that it is a question of opting, although probably not explicitly, for one or the other.

It is therefore suggested that the check which the Soviet troika proposal has administered to the developing concept of an operational U.N. should not be seen as a good reason for trying to ensure victory for that concept, but, rather as an occasion for reassessing the most fruitful potentialities of an Organization with nearly universal membership which has to function in a world which shows no sign of being ready for government. It is thought that the maintenance, in these conditions, of the universality of the U.N. is an achievement, and should not be lightly regarded. Even more sedulously to be nurtured is the growth, partly dependent on yet partly sustaining the universality of the Organization's membership, of the idea that the U.N. reflects the voice, or perhaps the conscience, of mankind. Both these developments could be jeopardized by an emphasis on the U.N. as an operational institution. Instead, the U.N. could be seen as standing for certain principles, which, like most principles, are a little, if not more, ahead of practice. Its role could be regarded as that of a conciliator, as an institution the members of which seek to reconcile the policies of disputants rather than develop a U.N. policy to which they would be expected to conform. This endeavour would have both its public and private aspects but the Organization would play down its operational possibilities, encouraging less than universal groups to engage in them, within their area, instead, so that its task in the direction of channelling moral pressure could the better be attended to. In it the Secretary-General would have a most important part to play. But his would not be a thrusting role. He would model himself on the Hammarskjöld of his first five year period in office³² rather than his second, bearing in mind the advice of a former high official of the League of Nations:

"Probably the best use to which any Secretary-General appointed under the U.N. Charter can make of the powers granted him is to lay them aside as a store of talents in a napkin to be drawn upon only when political bankruptcy is threatened . . . the Secretary-General of a council concerned with major issues of foreign policy should conceive of his functions as those rather of a diplomat and administrator than of a minister of state when dealing with political questions."³³

It is thought that, given today's conditions, this type of role is

³² For an assessment of Mr. Hammarskjöld's personal qualities and approach to international relations during the years 1953-1958, see. A. M. James, "The Role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in International Relations", in *International Relations*, October 1959.

³³ A. Loveday: *Reflections on International Administration* (1956), pp. 229-230.

the one which is most likely to lead to states behaving in accordance with the U.N.'s Principles and so lead on to the achievement of its Purposes. It is not as ambitious a role for the U.N. as many would like to see it play. But while, for the purposes of the passing of resolutions it may be properly said that the U.N. is more than the sum of its parts, it is not wise to regard the taking of the lead on the international stage by the U.N. as a practical proposition while the "they" which make up the "it" are divided about what should be done. The Organization has its flag, but its constituency has an infirm foundation: cracks are already there, and may deepen. The U.N. flag, in these circumstances, is not a symbol which acts as a rallying point. It represents, rather, an aspiration, the reaching of which lies along a long and tortuous road, which, if it is traversed at all, must, now that nuclear weapons make nonsense of the idea of conquest, be done so by all together. The party will move slowly, and straggle, but its majority is right to refuse to allow the possibility of an indefinite camp which a troika-headed Secretariat would permit. The majority would also be wise, however, to impose a self-denying ordinance on itself as a part of the larger group, for otherwise the expedition may disintegrate, and have great difficulty in coming together again.

BOOK REVIEWS

Temperament and Character of the Arabs. Sania Hamady. *Twayne Publishers*, New York. London, *Mark Paterson*. 55s.

The Struggle for Arab Independence. Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Feisal's Kingdom in Syria. Zeine N. Zeine. *Khayats*. 40s.

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The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism. J. M. Ahmed. *Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs*. 25s.

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Jordan. Anne Dearden. *Robert Hale*. 21s.

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The Balfour Declaration. Leonard Stein. *Valentine Mitchell*. 63s.

If as the old adage has it it is well to know your enemies, it is even better to know your friends, more particularly if "friendship" contains an element of "protection" not very far below the surface. Apart from a decline in British military power our great omission in the Middle East was our failure to realise how fast the old order was changing, and this failure stemmed in part from a lack of understanding of the people with whom we were dealing. The sheik, whose virtues and failings were typified by Ibn Saud and his ilk, were dying out under the impact of Western ideas. In their place came the urbanised, western-educated, rootless "white-collared" Intelligentsia, adrift between two worlds; ready tinder for incendiary nationalism. This group of books throws light on many aspects of the problems of that explosive area.

Dr. Hamady's valuable book is most illuminating. Had it only been available for the enlightenment of our administrators, advisors, foreign service officials and Middle Eastern experts earlier, many pitfalls set for the unwary could have been avoided. The myth of the frank and chivalrous Arab,—which was once no myth—the rugged individualist, "fond of horses, kings and Englishmen" is now safely buried, but we have still much to learn if we are to regain something of the respect we have lost. The characteristics that the author describes are not something suddenly acquired—they are writ large for all to read in the "Arabian Nights" and other such tales. Nor has she written her book to denigrate the Arab—simply to record the facts about his character as she found them. Her study will make intercourse between Westerners and Arabs easier, for the Westerner will not be so likely to make errors of judgement, then react violently against "the bad faith" of his vis-a-vis. It is useful to be reminded that "the Arab is above all men a believer in preserving appearances . . . He

is concerned with keeping up a constant role in public. (His) good manners are deceptive in three respects: he promises more than he can fulfil: he may undergo sudden changes from composure to loss of control and he has a special kind of diplomacy (based on) *tadlis* (blandishment)". "The Arab is more interested in feelings than in facts, in conveying an impression rather than giving a report". Flattery is a respected art ("Kiss the hand that you can't bite and pray that it will be broken"). His desire to please is the strongest when least disinterested and "may induce him to say what is agreeable without regard to truth". He "avoids a blunt refusal to any demand" and will evade the issue by any means to hand. Since hyperbole is an essential stylistic device—witness the terms in which Nasser's propaganda is cast—a moderately phrased case may imply approval of it. "Inexperienced British Officials in the war-time Levant who politely warned Arab leaders that their government would "view with disfavour" anti-French demonstrations, were taken to be beckoning the demonstrators on", and later protests in stronger terms were regarded as hypocrisy. Thus they got the worst of both worlds. As a Lebanese born and bred Dr. Hamady's insight is reliable and she has been able to say plainly what many western students have thought but hesitated to express so bluntly.

The particular merit of Professor Zeine's book is that, although he has lived all his life in the Middle East and is Head of the Faculty of History at the American University of Beirut, he is not an Arab but Persian and a Bahai. His detachment and range of languages have been most valuable adjuncts to the writing of his scholarly book. In it he sets out the story of how Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George attempted to create independent Arab states, while at the same time endowing them with advisors whose advice had to be followed. The two dominating figures at these negotiations were Clemenceau and the Emir Feisal and the drama fell into three acts. The first, in Paris, shows Feisal as an impressive figure, both in demeanour and in his faith in his friends, while the real issues lay concealed behind a smoke screen compounded of good manners and procrastination. In the second, Clemenceau, determined to re-establish the French in Syria, wore down Lloyd George's resistance, as later over German reparations. Wilson left and the French emerged victorious, a complete betrayal of Feisal's hopes. In the third Feisal overplayed his hand and the British, swayed by our strong ties with the French, sided against him. The outcome was a double shock to the Arabs in that they felt that they had fought the war against the Turks only to re-introduce the infidel into the Levant; and that their hope of reviving the glories of the Muslim Empire was betrayed. So strong was this feeling that at one point Feisal even got into touch with Mustapha Kemal. The Arab desire to belong once again to a larger and grander unit explains much that has happened since.

In "Divide and Lose" Mr. Ionides reinforces these arguments. As he puts it the newly independent Arab States with whom Britain sought to sign or signed treaties in the period following the First and Second World Wars, were only partially independent, since the British by retaining certain local military rights, were assured of an ultimate sanction. They were offered freedom to do right, but not to do wrong; and the final arbiter of right and wrong in foreign policy was to be found in Whitehall. The popular Arab longing was for complete freedom, so that the rulers and magnates who signed the treaties found themselves in a position of relaying British requirements to an unwilling people. Occasionally it was found necessary to apply the built-in sanctions, as in Iraq in 1941 and in Egypt in 1942. The British, hard pressed at the time, did not view their actions in this light, but this was the interpretation given to them by the majority of Arabs under fifty. Moreover popular pressure was directed to achieving long overdue social reforms, but the rulers, in order to uphold treaties

which in the last resort restricted their freedom, were forced to rely for support on the most conservative of their subjects, usually men of property, scarcely likely to undermine their own position. The logic of this argument may not be acceptable to the British, but what matters is that it is firmly believed by the majority of Arabs. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 broke the treaty ring, thus completing the Arab revolt of 1916. Nasser was free to negotiate with whomsoever he pleased, in 1954 he chose to do so with Britain. Then Sir Anthony Eden and Nuri by joining the Baghdad Pact re-vamped the old relationship. The Pact not only divided rulers from people but also Nuri from Nasser. Finally the Suez affair proved conclusively that Britain's aim was still that of domination. From that moment Nuri was doomed, doubly so since Eden had ignored his warning that at all costs Britain must never make common cause with Israel. The author discusses the Palestine question at great length; in common with all Arabs he sees Zionism under every conference table and as everywhere triumphant, with Britain bent on abetting it. The book is, however biased, of the greatest value as stating the case solely from the Arab angle. There is enough truth in the detached account of the position resulting from the treaty system to make it salutary reading.

Mr. J. M. Ahmed is concerned with a theme that is rarely studied in the West—that of the attempt by a group of Egyptian thinkers and writers, led by Sheikel Muhammed Adbus and Ahmed Lutfi Sayjid, to modify Islamic thinking and practice in such a way as to make them a vital force in modern society. Lutfi wrote in 1912 “the dominant civilisation today is European and the only possible foundation for our progress in Egypt is the transmission of the principles of that civilisation”, but it should be accepted as a stimulus to advance, not slavishly copied. The book sets the background against which the Egyptian revolution took place.

Professor Gabrieli on the other hand presents the Arab revival as a single movement and skilfully combines the threads of the story in Egypt, Arabia, the Fertile Crescent and the Maghreb. It was Mouri Sayjid's challenging project to unite Iraq with Syria in 1942 that drove Egypt to assume the leadership of a larger and looser Arab League. The union between Egypt and Syria stems from very ancient roots. It was revived by Mohammed Ali founder of modern Egypt, in 1830, but only lasted ten years. From 1840 onwards however, the two countries had always preserved a strong cultural unity, born of western contacts, which formed the real core of the awakening Arab world. As he follows the tale from Ottoman oppression through the period of Western tutelage finally emerging into the full dawn of independence in our day, he is saddened by how much has been lost by the way. The old Arab chivalry and the liberalism of the earlier nationalists have gone, and in many cases have been replaced by a rabid xenophobia. Traces of these former virtues still survive in the Maghreb but none are to be found in the Arab East. This is the penalty, perhaps inevitably, paid for having reached independence in the mid-twentieth century with liberalism generally in decline and totalitarianism rampant.

Mr. Marlowe has written a most accomplished and sophisticated account of contemporary Arab politics, of Britain's decline and Nasser's rise. The author displays a mastery of the facts coupled with good political judgement and no trace of distorting prejudice. He views events from the standpoint of the rise and subsequent decline of Egyptian imperialism. This leads to a too simplified view and the author ignores the many other factors affecting the rest of the Arab States which do not fit into the theme of President Nasser's attempt to replace British hegemony with Egyptian. He underestimates the roles of Syria and the Lebanon and the deep roots of the drive towards Arab unity.

He concludes that after Suez British policy has reverted from a twentieth

century attempt to secure and maintain a British hegemony in the Middle East to a nineteenth century policy of preventing the attainment of that hegemony by anybody else. He remarks perceptively that the Arabs score few political successes since they refuse to live with circumstances which they are too weak to alter.

They lose all in Palestine because they will "never face the clear cut issue between fighting and negotiating". The Arab League is a mere facade since no single member is strong enough to dominate it, yet none will abandon the competition for leadership, nor will they unite in agreeing on common ends or common action. The Middle East is now only important to the West in two contexts, tension with Russia and a seller's market for oil. Britain is praised both for the good done during her period of ascendancy and for her final, though tardy, realisation that attempts to retain her foothold in Nasser's Egypt bred, rather than countered subversion. Nasser is given too much credit for statesmanship and his faults of impetuosity and short-sighted tactlessness in dealing with his Arab neighbours are played down. But part of his handicap in attempting to play the role of leader of the Middle East lies in the paucity of the natural resources at his disposal.

Of the two books on Sudan one, that of Mr. Fabunnu, views the scene from an unusual standpoint, that of a Nigerian from ex-British West Africa. The other, by Mr. P. M. Holt, is that of a historian and Arabic scholar who has worked in the Sudanese Department of Education and has a very warm spot for his subject.

Mr. Fabunnu's most illuminating passages are those which are both detached and African. He says that "British rule was disliked not so much for being so bad as so alien", and adds that there is no evidence to show that Egyptian capitalists would not have equally exploited the Sudanese though "perhaps the exploitation of kith and kin is less unkindly". The book was first written as a Ph.D. thesis and unfortunately bears unmistakable traces of its origin. It is so thickly set with facts as to be almost indigestible. The author has an exhaustive knowledge of the source, material, and it is hoped that he may find an opportunity of putting this to more instructive use for a wider public at a later date.

Mr. Holt used his spare time to dig into the archives of the pre- Condominium period in the Sudan which were captured by Kitchener but have since been left untouched. They cover the period of Egyptian rule, the Mahdist revolution and the reign of the Kalifa. The author reveals that when Africans ran Africa their administration was far from being inefficient. He also explodes the legend that the Mahdist revolt was directed against Egyptian misrule, a statement that he says is unwarranted and unhistorical, and asserts that the Kalifa, though erratic in his behaviour, (for instance in his alternations between consulting Slatin Pasha and throwing him into chains), was "much less a malevolent despot and much more the prisoner of his circumstances than the contemporary European writers were willing to perceive." Queen Victoria's distress over Gordon has been the cause of much misjudgement. His pronouncements on the reign of the British are equally stimulating. He sees their merits and also their shortcomings, the latter including a tendency (which they will be surprised to learn they shared with the Kalifa) to cosset and advance the tribes in order to maintain their sway over the towns. His analysis of the reasons why fifty years of education for democracy resulted in only four years (1954-58) of Parliamentary Government is as lucid and informative as the rest of this short and most excellent book.

The history of the French mandate in Syria and the Lebanon was not a happy one. French claims to the mandate were based on a desire to strengthen a centuries old *mission civilisatrice* by the addition of political control. When the mandate came to an end it was found that the coveted

political control had been a complete failure and that what France in fact left in the Levant was a rich and continuing legacy of education, public works, law and order.

In an effort to establish a firm foundation for political control France pushed aside, as valueless, the growing aspirations of Syrians and Lebanese. True, as always and everywhere, a small group of clients soon rallied to encourage the French to believe that they were loved and wanted by the local inhabitants, but the French failure to recognise how shallow and self-interested these avowals of affection were, led to increasing friction between rulers and ruled. The French administration in Beirut, always at the mercy of the ever changing governments in Paris, acted as if the mandate was meant to last for ever. It ended when it did, simply because it became unworkable. Mr. Longrigg has given us more than a history of the Levant under French rule. He has painstakingly ferretted out the war-time promises made by unauthorised Britains to the French or to the Arabs and calmly assessed the basic reasons for French suspicions of British actions in the Middle East during the two great wars. He has been far from limiting himself to discussions of French shortcomings, and, in fact, points out that these are too often stressed at the expense of their achievements; not only by the Arabs but also by British, Italian and American critics.

Independent Iraq is a second edition of a book which appeared in 1951. It covers a distinct period of Iraqi history which was dominated by the personality of Nuri-es-Said, and marked by the monotonous recurrence of coups d'etats at home, and subservience to Britain in foreign policy. Attention is almost entirely concentrated upon the extremely involved internal political situation with little mention of social or economic affairs. It also covers at some length Iraqi foreign policy particularly during the time of co-operation with Nazi Germany. The July 1958 revolution with which the book ends, is in the direct tradition of all previous coup d'etats. It has introduced a new era of strident nationalism, pronounced social discontent, rising Communist influence and a foreign policy completely divorced from that of Britain. It remains to be seen what the next turn of fortune's wheel may reveal.

Miss Dearden has done for Jordan what Philbey has done for Saudi Arabia. From purely Jordanian sources she has built up the troubled history of the country from its earliest days. The whole of its modern history is short enough to be covered by the memories of the living Jordanians and English who made it. The only one missing is the assassinated King Abdullah, but he left behind him two lively volumes of memoirs which the author has used extensively. Her admiration for his policies may not be shared by all her readers. Cairo and Damascus would certainly resent the account of Jordan's role, and particularly that of the Arab Legion, in the Palestine warfare of 1948, of which they prefer another version however tendentious, and an Israeli account of the never ending border incidents would also be a different one. The book gives a good idea of what pressures, built up over the past forty years, have resulted in the present position in Jordan. It ends in 1957 but the future of Jordan is no more assured today than it was then, although King Hussein appears to be more firmly in the saddle than seemed possible some short time ago.

St. Anthony's Papers are an admirable collection of essays which plunge into Middle Eastern history at a variety of times and places. Professor William Polk gives an analysis of contemporary American policy and shows that its anti-Communist inspiration is a too limited conception to produce constructive results. Mr. Alan Cunningham writes of the Levantine Dragomen who served the British Embassy in Turkey in the nineteenth century. Professor Andre Raymond describes how Lord Salisbury traded

Tunisia to France as a *quid pro quo* for the acquisition of Cyprus; now equally lost to us. From Professor Eli Kedourie there is a study of Sa'ad Zaghlul, that redoubtable Egyptian Nationalist, and his tortuous relations with the British; and from Mr. Emile Marniorstein an ingenious explanation of that much debated phrase in Sir Henry MacMahon's note to Sharif Husein of October 1915 "... Portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab ..." He traces the terminology to Gibbon's eighteenth century description of the ethnic position in the territories of the Crusader kingdom at the turn of the eleventh century, and suggests that Sir Mark Sykes, with his devotion to historical analogies, may have romantically grafted the phrase into the MacMahon draft.

The leading essay comes from Miss Elizabeth Monroe, writing on "Mr. Bevin's Arab Policy", she places it within the framework of British pre-occupations at the time. She shows that at a period of near-war with Russia, with bread rationing in Britain, Palestine was one of the lesser problems, and decisions on its fate were subordinated to matters of more pressing moment. Mr. Bevin emerges as pro-British rather than pro-Arab.

Finally in *The Balfour Declaration* Mr. Leonard Stein has produced a definitive history of modern Palestine, the country which dominates political thinking throughout the Middle East. He has written an overwhelmingly thorough and meticulously documented study of the brief letter sent during the first World War by the Foreign Secretary of the British Government to Lord Rothschild, a representative English Jew. That letter has been the foundation of British policy towards the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine for thirty years. It was the basis of the mandate conferred upon Britain by the League of Nations and the precursor of the State of Israel. Mr. Stein is a lawyer trained to assess evidence, a humanist with a classical background and a prominent member of British Jewry well qualified for his task. The work is divided into four parts, *The Background: 1908-1914; The Preliminaries: 1914-1916; The Year of Decision: 1917; Epilogue: 1917-1920.*

The Declaration was made public in November 1917 on the very day that Lenin assumed power in Russia and did not therefore even reach the headlines; a strange fact about a decision which was later to bring down on Britain embarrassment, opprobrium and even ignominy. Because of its consequences, which are still far from being worked out, it is important to know why this way of helping the Jews was chosen. In the course of his work Mr. Stein explodes several myths; including the classic one, spread by Lloyd George, that Palestine was bartered for a chemical discovery by Weizmann, and that the promise was a bargain struck in order to step up American funds for the war effort, a mistaken aim since most rich American Jews tended to be anti-Zionist, if not anti-European.

The main fact revealed is that this was the third time that such a declaration had been contemplated and that, on each occasion, the motive behind the declaration was different. The first occasion but by far the most extraordinary was in March 1916, when, with the Russians defeated, France beleaguered at Verdun, Gallipoli just evacuated, Townsend tottering on the brink in Kut and the Sherif of Mecca not yet in rebellion, Asquith and Grey, who were far from happy about British expansion as a result of the carving up of Turkey, consulted Paris and Petrograd on the expediency of making the Jews an offer of Palestine that might result in rallying world Jewry to our side. The author confesses himself baffled by the antecedents of this communication, to which he could find no trace of any reply. The lack of source material here contrasts with the vast amount available for the Lloyd George period. The next occasion was

Spring 1917 when the motive force was increased rivalry with France in the Levant. It was thought that Jewish help would reinforce the British claim to the southern part of what was then Syria. But again the idea was dropped. The third time was November 1917, with British troops capturing Palestine and the focus of anxiety the deteriorating situation in Russia. The fear was that Kerensky and the Jews who owned Russia's armament industry, would drop out of the War. There was also concern about the apathy in America and the possibility of a rival German offer. However groundless, these preoccupations were sufficient to result in the Declaration.

Mr. Stein has done his work so well that his book will undoubtedly become the main authoritative source for these tangled negotiations. If it has a fault it is that, although the Jewish opposition to Zionism is fully explored, that of the British is only lightly touched upon. The book is extremely well written and should be read by a large public, for the Palestine problem is still very much with us.

The Common Law of Mankind. C. W. Jenks. London, *Stevens*. 63s.

International Immunities. C. W. Jenks. *Stevens*. 35s.

The British Year Book of International Law. Edited by C. H. M. Waldock. London, New York, Toronto. *Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs*. 60s.

Grotius Society Transactions for the Year 1957. *The Grotius Society*, 1959. 35s.

Report on the 49th Conference of the International Law Association at Hamburg, 1960. 80s.

Consular Law and Immunities. Luke T. Lee. *Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs*. 5 gns.

The Relation between International Law and Municipal Law in the Netherlands and the United States. L. Erades and Wesley L. Gould. Leyden, *Sythoff*. New York, *Oceana Publications*. D.fl.39.

At no other period in history has there perhaps been so great a need to establish the rule of law in the international community. And this need should be translated in the most limited and down-to-earth terms, the necessity for the general acceptance of a minimum of basic rules which shall govern inter-State conduct. It is, of course, true that in theory such a body of rules exists, but in practice they are only too often ignored or evaded, and on many of the most essential points there is still wide disagreement. If we are ever to reach the stage at which force or the threat of force ceases to be an instrument of national policy—and today it has become a suicidal one—then generally and actively recognised rules of law must replace it.

"The Common Law of Mankind" is a collection of eight essays written since 1951 and now published together with two new ones. The first of these, "Atoms for Peace in International Law" discusses the problems of international organisation and legislation and of customary law created by the great technical revolution of our time. The second, "The Universality of International Law" is much more general and important. It advances the thesis that "contemporary international law must be regarded as the common law of mankind in an early stage of its development". Basing himself upon the statement that "from a political standpoint we have attained a universal legal order", Dr. Jenks proceeds to ask how it is possible to fuse these formal elements into a legal system with sufficiently deep and broad foundations to command the allegiance of a world community with a fundamentally changed composition and distribution of influence". This leads to the question of "How far can we successfully

invoke general principles of law recognised by civilised nations in a world in which the civil and common law must share their supremacy with Islamic law, Hindu law, Chinese law and Soviet law". This theme is developed at considerable and fascinating length. But is it not possible to argue that these systems, while presumably having their part to play regionally, need not necessarily determine the content of a universal public international law? That, on the contrary, they have little specifically to contribute to the body of general principles envisaged in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court, since they were not, with the exception of Soviet law, framed in an era of sovereign independent nation States, the "subjects" of international law as such? Is it not more likely that the emerging States will accept the western European framework and that that framework will be expanded to meet not the requirements of various systems of law but those of the evolving international community? In any case this book is most persuasively written with "that breadth of outlook and boldness of approach" which the author claims are essential "to the progress of contemporary international law". The other essays cover "The Scope of International Law", "The Impact of International Organisations on International Law and Colonial Policy", "Employment Policy in International Law", "An International Régime for Antarctica", "International Law and Activities in Space" and "Craftsmanship in International Law".

In "International Immunities" Dr. Jenks asserts that these are an essential device in the present state of development of world organisation for the purpose of preventing unilateral, and sometimes irresponsible, control by particular governments of the activities of international organisations. "These organisations have been created by agreement amongst governments to discharge important, and in some cases vital, responsibilities on behalf of the world community as a whole, with freedom, with independence and with impartiality" and must not become the instrument of any State. The work is divided into three parts. Part I is concerned with the growth in number and the present position of the people covered at duty stations and on temporary missions throughout the world and the need to adopt a functional test as the measure of immunity. Part II covers the immunity of the person, government representatives, interparliamentary assemblies, international armed forces, officials, experts and contractors, and so on, and the safeguards against abuses are indicated. Part III is devoted to the International Organisations themselves, the U.N., the World Bank, the I.L.O.—here the "General convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations" of 1946 and the "Convention on the Specialised Agencies" of 1947 set the basic pattern and Dr. Jenks examines these and quarries into the rich material buried in the "U.N. Legislative Series, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions concerning the Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities of International Organisations". In scope and completeness this is a most valuable pioneer work.

The latest issue of the "British Year Book" opens with a moving tribute to Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in the form of the address delivered by Dr. Jenks at the funeral.

As usual it covers a very wide range of subjects. A paper by D. H. N. Johnson on "The Conclusions of International Conferences" "a no-man's land between the law of treaties and the law relating to international conferences" is of considerable interest to non-legal students. The author writes that there "seems to be a degree of confusion in the minds of delegates as to the precise legal nature of the forms available for expressing the conclusions of such a conference", a confusion that is far from confined to delegates, "... It is hoped ... that the mere revelation of the confusion which exists may contribute towards a solution". He draws in

particular on his experience at the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, an aspect of which Miss J. A. C. Gutteridge deals with in an article on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. She ends "That it has been possible to reach agreement on legal rules governing the continental shelf which are in step with the considerable technical advances in the exploitation of the shelf and with the needs of the international community may give encouragement to those who believe that the law of the sea is capable of fruitful and progressive development especially in regard to the two still unsettled questions of the territorial sea and fishery limits". An historical controversy over the freedom of the seas is the main subject of a paper by Dr. C. H. Alexandrowicz writing on the dispute between Grotius and Freitas.

Dr. F. A. Mann discusses "The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons" with his usual brilliant lucidity in dealing with a most complicated problem. Professor Julius Stone comes to an unconventional conclusion as to the power of the international judge in his paper on "Non-Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community". Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice continues his valuable series on the law and practice of the International Court of Justice. His analytical comments are, as always, extremely acute, and he gives great weight to the separate opinions of individual judges. There are papers on "Conflicts of Laws in Time" by J. K. Grodecki and "The Incidence of the Exhaustion of the Rules of Local Remedies" from the angle of the link of the industrial with the defendant State by T. Meron. There are a number of "Notes on the Mode of Citation of International Court Decisions" by Dr. C. W. Jenks; "The Immunity of Embassy Premises" by H. P. Romberg; "Three International Commodity Agreements" by X; "Some Recent Applications of International Law by the United States—II" by J. E. S. Fawcett; and "Recognition and Modern Methods of International Co-operation" by Professor M. Lachs. The volume concludes with a summary of "Decisions of British Courts during 1958-9, Involving Questions of Public International Law" (by A. B. Lyons) and "Private International Law" (by B. P. Carter), and some excellent book reviews.

"The Transactions for 1957" consist of eight papers. Professor Wortley writes on "The Mexican Oil Dispute 1938-1946", which he describes as something of a typical case history on the modern indirect technique of expropriation. He emphasises the need for effective arbitration and valuation arrangements in such cases and suggests that "the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations" may be a useful basis for arbitral adjudication. He stresses the unsatisfactory nature of local standards of value which cannot be relied upon to be objective. Mr. Brandon deals with "Legal Deterrents and Incentives to Private Foreign Investment" and points out that if the underdeveloped countries are anxious to encourage such investment it is essential to obviate the fear of expropriation or confiscation and to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, co-operation and good faith which may exist regardless of paper guarantees, often in themselves worthless in practice. Dr. D. W. Bowett on "The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals" argues that even after the Charter of the U.N., the right of protection by force of the property of nationals abroad is still, subject to control, lawful. He regrets the absence, more especially in cases where the interests of the State or its nationals are essential, *i.e.* their destruction would involve an immediate and serious injury, of a judicial body vested with compulsory jurisdiction over the question of the legality of self-defence. Mr. D. H. N. Johnson's "Piracy in Modern International Law" is mainly devoted to a discussion of whether piracy *jure gentium* must be committed on the high seas and for private ends—a question which became somewhat

unexpectedly extremely topical with the seizure of the *Santa Maria* by Captain Galvao.

Dr. Micklem, in a most interesting contribution, deals with "The Philosophical Tradition in International Law". Mr. Morgan is concerned to argue that the operation of the conflict of laws can be applied to wholly domestic situations, and Dr. Simmonds on "Some Precursors of Hugo Grotius" writes of the work of English authors on the law of the sea and of war. The volume concludes with Dr. O'Connell's paper dealing with "Some Problems of the Interaction of International Law and Constitutional Law in Federal States", a subject that is of increasing importance as federations multiply.

In a wise and witty speech at the Annual Dinner, Lord Strang defined three problems of particular concern to the layman. The first of these is the "eternal conflict between law in the abstract and the justice of the case", dwelt upon by Sir Patrick Devlin in his Hamlyn lectures on Trial by Jury. This conflict is particularly apt to arise in the sphere of international law where "the political element holds a large place. The state of the law is over wide fields, uncertain, it is not universally accepted, is only too apt to be infringed or disregarded, and often provides no remedy for a delinquency". In this situation it was surprising how lightly government actions were branded as legal or illegal. His second point was the infrequency with which a member of the International Court of Justice delivers a judgment against the country of which he is a national—which might be partly explained by the fact that both the Judge and the members of his government had been nurtured in a particular conception of international law, and thirdly whether the divergence, already apparent between doctrines in certain spheres of international law, such as state responsibility, is likely to increase—a question of immense importance in view of the growing tendency for the claims of international peace and security to be emphasised at the expense of those of justice, and those of sovereignty above those of protection of foreign rights. There is much need for the contribution which the Society could make in view of its aim of treating "all international instances in an absolutely independent spirit, endeavouring to discover the truth whatever it may be, to discuss all doctrines of international law . . . and to suggest reforms based on humanity and justice wherever possible".

The subjects discussed during the 49th Conference of the International Law Association included the Law of International Waterways, International Company Law, the Legal Problems of a United Nations Force, International Trade Marks, the Judicial Aspects of Nationalisation and Foreign Property, Air and Space Law, the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the Judicial Aspects of Co-existence, International Monetary Law, International Commercial Arbitration, International Medical Law, and the Custody of Children.

The Conference adopted a number of very useful resolutions. Of special interest to laymen is that outlining further study on a United Nations Force, with particular regard to the desirability of draft standing orders for the guidance of a United Nations Command; the advantages and disadvantages of a Force consisting of contingents or of one individually recruited; the implications and advantages and disadvantages of an *ad hoc* or of a permanent Force, and the rules governing civil and criminal liability resulting from the activities of such a Force; and also that dealing with outer space, which recommended that outer space and celestial bodies should be utilised only for peaceful purposes, and that they should not be subject to the claims of sovereignty or other exclusive rights by any State. The discussions were extremely lively and once again demonstrated clearly how very difficult it is to reach any form of final

agreement, however much common ground may be discovered during the interim stages, on any matter of real substance.

"The Relation Between International Law And Municipal Law" is an exhaustive pioneer study concerned with the interpretation and application of international law by the national courts of the Netherlands and the United States respectively. Its importance is emphasised by the fact that "international law is much more frequently applied by the thousands of national courts throughout the world than by the few international courts that are mostly accessible only to States and not to individuals. . . . Decisions of national courts on points of international law cannot be properly understood when one does not know the relation between international and municipal law in the country of the court concerned", this "differs from country to country . . . it is also essential to know both the statutes and powers (of the courts of a given country) and the main features of the laws they administer". The work is in two volumes of which this is the first, the second will analyse and compare Netherlands and American case law on substantive issues of international law. The authors are well qualified for their task—the result incidentally of a chance encounter—Mr. Erades is the Vice-President of the District Court of Rotterdam and the Editor of the Netherlands *Tydeschrift*. Mr. Gould is associate Professor of Government in Purdue University. The work is divided into five parts: Part I, *Government Institutions* covers (1) Foundation of the State, (2) Governmental Structures, (3) Legislative Processes. Part II, *The Legal Orders*: (4) Forms, Sources and Hierarchies, (5) Some Principles of Law and Legislation. Part III, *Courts and Their Procedures*: (6) The Courts, (7) Civil Procedures, (8) Executives, Legislatures and Foreign Affairs, (9) Judicial Application of International Law, (10) Customary International Law: Direct or Indirect Application? (11) International Agreements: Direct or Indirect Application? Part IV, *Conflicts between Municipal Law and International Law*: (12) Municipal Law and International Customs, (13) International Agreements and Antecedent Statutes, (14) International Agreements and Subsequent Statutes. (15) Conflicts between Constitution and International Law.

The last book is an extremely useful handbook on consular law and practice which may fill the gap until the International Law Commission finally succeeds in producing an agreed code. The author, a Carnegie Research Fellow of Harvard University, has laid particular stress on modern consular law. The duties of consuls have been greatly affected by the political, social and economic changes of recent years. The rise of air transport and tourism, the technological revolution and the subsequent trend towards the international development of business interests, the ideological conflict and the increasing assumption by consular officers of cultural, political and economic activities have all contributed to a marked change in the status and responsibilities of the local consul. Moreover, in most countries there is an increasing tendency towards the interchange of consular and diplomatic officials. The study is based on State practice as reflected in judicial decisions and consular regulations and instructions, treaties, doctrines and draft codes. It covers the field admirably and is a mine of information, not only for lawyers and diplomats but also for students of international relations and political science.

Tanganyika and International Trusteeship. B. T. G. Chidzero. *Oxford University Press*. London, New York, Toronto. *For the Royal Institute of International Affairs*. 38s.

The author, a Southern Rhodesian of African descent, studied political science at Ottawa and McGill Universities and is now working with the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa.

In this extremely competent fair-minded and well-written book, he sets out to assess the influence of international trusteeship on the British administration and development of Tanganyika, and comes to the cautious conclusion, after a detached and systematic study of all the available evidence, that it has had some beneficial effects. His appraisal is concentrated on four main points. Part I deals with the question of a close union between the East African territories as desired by the business and planter interests in the '20s and '30s. Here the policy of the Mandate's Commission and that of the British Government went hand in hand, both precluded any association or federation until after the attainment of independence. Part II covers the questions of the form of political development and the British idea of a multiracial society. Although firmly denouncing in Part III indirect rule and increased opportunities for Africans in the civil service during the depression of the thirties as "expedients wrapped in benevolence" he does not do so without an understanding of the underlying aim, of achieving a balanced representation of each community in order to avoid swamping the minority populations of Europeans and Asians; both of whom he regards as essential to the development of the country. When coming to the dynamic political activity of the past fifteen years he shows that although the Trusteeship Council forced the pace towards straightforward representative institutions on the basis of universal franchise, the British government were also panting along the same track and in the same direction; although they occasionally threw a regretful glance over their shoulders towards the vanishing concepts of gradualism and multi-racialism. It also contains an excellent account of local Asian reaction to African nationalism (pages 191-2) and discusses some of the problems of a mixed population. But in confining his attention to the divisions between black, white and brown, the author tends to over-simplify or ignore the differences of shades of creed and custom within the black group, which are, perhaps, as great or greater than the differences that separate the immigrant races from the African. These will pose problems for an independent Tanganyika that may cause many to cast a nostalgic backward look at the protection provided jointly by Trusteeship and British rule. Part IV deals with the all-important question of land ownership and here the author leaves little doubt that international trusteeship played a vital part. In contrast to Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, only 2% of land has been alienated for European settlement or production in forty years of British rule, and there is no geographical segregation of the populations. The only form of alienation allowed beyond that has been the leasing of land on a ninety-nine year basis for experimental agricultural purposes. The author concludes that Trusteeship has "generally rendered British rule less a matter of expediency and more of a matter of principle, . . . less a function of settler pressure and more a matter geared to international obligations. It has greatly . . . reinforced the liberal forces within British policy-making circles." The volume includes a good index and some excellent maps.

The British Commonwealth: The Development of its Laws and Constitutions.

The Union of South Africa. Edited by Professor H. R. Hahlo and Professor Ellison Kahn. *Stevens*. 90s.

Malaya and Singapore: the Borneo Territories. Edited by L. A. Sheridan. *Stevens*. 84s.

These two books are Volumes 5 and 9 respectively in an extremely useful and informative series, which fills a long-felt need.

The South African volume is an exhaustive compendium of the whole field of South African public law and, as such, is as useful to South African

lawyers as to legal and constitutional students in other countries. The work consists of chapters covering the origin, sources and "spirit" of South African law; the first synopsis of the South African conflict of laws; economic and racial legislation, dealing *inter alia* with the principles of mining laws; legislation against monopolies, and a multitude of racial laws. There is a detailed discussion of the history and present state of the administration of justice in the country. Constitutional development up till 1910 is fully described and is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional law of the Union. There are also four critical chapters on criminal law and on the recognition of native law and the creation of native courts. The various branches of private law are concisely dealt with, covering the person, family relationships, contract, delict, enrichment, property and succession, and there is a lucid analysis of mercantile law.

In setting out the law as it is the authors have paid considerable attention to the many controversial issues and in a number of instances they have put forward their own original solutions to the problems raised. In writing they have not only taken account of old authority and modern case law, but also of the legal literature. The theme running through the book is essentially that of the refashioning of law in the light of experience—a process far from ended in a society so deeply and unhappily divided. In addition to an Index and a bibliography there is a useful chronology and tables of Cases and Statutes.

The volume on Malaya and Singapore and the Borneo Territories has had the advantage of skilled and decisive editorship, so that it presents a coherent whole. The task set was a far from easy one for, although the common law had been established in Malaya for nearly two hundred years, there are very few reported judgments to go on. After 1932 there are no reports at all that can be traced in the (Unfederated) Malay States, except in the case of Johore.

Other complications arise from the conglomeration of races, Malays, Chinese, Hindus and others, which go to make up the population of the Peninsula. As a result the law throughout Malaya is a mixture of common law and equity, as worked out by English barristers confined to obsolete books and a vague recollection of what they learnt in the Temple; customary laws regulating the personal and domestic relationships of the various racial groups together with local and imperial legislation. Of this last there is no lack. "Enactments pour out from what must surely be the highest concentration of legislatures per head of population to be found anywhere in the world." There would seem to have been no fewer than nineteen such "law factories" in the area covered by the book. There are a series of population tables and two good maps. In an area of the Commonwealth where divisive factors are so strong, this is an admirable contribution to unity.

In both cases the editors have been ably assisted by a panel of expert colleagues without whose help it would have been virtually impossible to cover such an enormous field.

Britain in World Affairs. Lord Strang. *Faber and Faber, and Andre Deutsch.* 30s.

The chief aim of British foreign policy has always been the same as that of every other country, to maintain and further its interests. Lord Strang surveys our efforts to achieve these aims from the time of Henry VIII to Queen Elizabeth II.

Both America and Great Britain have, up to now, been singularly lucky in maintaining a large measure of freedom of action without the necessity of any attempt at continental conquest. America, protected by distance

and the shield of British naval power, could safely pursue a policy of isolation. Up to the middle of the seventeenth century British policy had varied between periods of isolation and periods of continental adventures. Her rise to world power and supremacy at sea brought a change, she no longer harboured continental ambitions and her policy alternated between that of refusing to undertake any obligations, or to make any commitments whenever this seemed both wise and possible; and that of intervening in foreign issues, of accepting obligations and commitments whenever British interests were thought to require it. Policy swung from efforts to gain control of part of the continent, to trying to prevent anyone else from succeeding in such an attempt.

In view of this second practice it is a mistake to regard Britain as traditionally isolationist; this was merely a policy employed when necessary. Lord Strang is mainly interested in this switch of policy and is not so much concerned with the different structure of world relationships at various periods, although he is fully aware that Britain's policy has changed with the change in her position in an equally changing world. He puts the height of British influence in the world in the generations immediately following Waterloo, when she was "the strongest, richest, and most powerful country in the world". But even at the height of her power she was never in a position to fight a continental war alone. Her power of direct action in Europe was slight. Castlereagh, Canning and Wellington could not save Poland from Russia, restrain the French from temporarily reimposing despotism in Spain by force of arms, or protect Turkey from a Russian attack. At no time were we capable of waging war without allies. As Claredon said of the Crimean in 1865, "We could not have made war alone for we should have had all Europe against us at once. The United States would have followed in train". In 1956 we proved the truth of this once again in Egypt. The present conviction of the steep decline in British power is partly due to an overestimate of our past predominance. It is true that America realised how much she left to Great Britain between 1815 and 1941. As Mr. Walter Lippmann wrote in 1937, the premise of American isolation had always been an international system "in which naval power in British hands is predominant over all military power." Between the wars we let our naval supremacy slip from our grasp, whether necessarily or not is an open question, and the growth of air power and weapons of mass destruction have entirely altered the situation. Lord Strang's contention that Great Britain cannot play a full part in the Commonwealth if she becomes too closely associated with Europe may not hold good, more especially as in the light of developments the future of the Commonwealth is becoming highly questionable. This is a most valuable and informative book aimed at the general reader who could not fail to profit from it.

Between War and Peace. Herbert Feis. *Princeton University Press.* London, *Oxford University Press.* 36s.

Mr. Feis has followed his earlier studies of diplomacy during the Second World War with a clear and detailed analysis of the events leading up to the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 and of the agreements reached there on the post-war settlement of Europe. The negotiations, difficult enough in view of the fact that the real settlement was already dictated by the actual military situation in the field at the end of the War, were not made any easier by the fact that, both Roosevelt and Churchill had gone, leaving Stalin to face a new and necessarily inexperienced President and a new Prime Minister less forceful than his masterful predecessor.

This will remain a standard text-book both for the facts and for the

depiction of the Conference itself. The author makes it clear that it was the United States Government which invented the "package deal" by which, in exchange for the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western provisional frontier pending the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Russians agreed to separate reparation policies for each German zone and the admission of Italy to the United Nations as soon as the peace treaty with her had been concluded. There was, in fact, no alternative policy open. Mr. Feis is inclined to think that the Polish move should have been firmly resisted and that there should have been a fixed stance of opposition backed by American and British arms in Europe, or a complete disassociation, after spoken protest, from the Soviet course in Poland. But the first alternative would have entailed the possibility of war between Russia and the Western Allies, an eventuality which public opinion would not have been prepared to accept, and moreover it would have run counter to America's anxiety to continue to work with Russia both because of a wish for her aid against Japan and for her collaboration in the establishment of the United Nations. Simple disassociation would neither have impressed the Russians nor affected the outcome. And then, as now, many of the best cards were in the Russian hand. It is only necessary to mention Austria, Italy, the Italian ex-colonies in Africa, Greece, the control of the Straits and of Tangier, to make this abundantly clear. In the event—through using them as pressure points—she was content to consolidate her hold on Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania—a sphere which in view of earlier agreements she was probably justified in claiming as her share—and since she was physically in control it would have been impossible to dislodge her. With the situation which has grown from these seeds we are still wrestling.

In his concluding chapter the author makes a moving plea for a more rational approach to international problems. He recognises the dangers for the barriers of mutual interest are slight ones when set against unsubdued national rivalries and resentments. But the alternative is complete mutual destruction; "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore choose life that both thee and thy seed may live". To choose life the great nations must one and all live and act more maturely and trustfully than they did during the months that followed the end of the war against Germany. "... The capacity of men to respond to reason ... and to master their passionate purposes and fancies is undergoing its ultimate test."

The Just War. A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine. Robert W. Tucker. *John Hopkins Press*. London, *Oxford University Press*. 40s.

National Security in the Nuclear Age. Edited by Gordon B. Turner and Richard D. Challener. *Stevens*. 45s.

Strategy for the '60s. Foreign Policy Clearing House. Washington. \$2.

Duel at the Brink. Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz. *Weidenfeld & Nicolson*. 21s.

The two men who shaped American policy in the 1950s were John Foster Dulles and General Curtis le May; their views were of a comforting and solid simplicity and had the merit of being easily understood by the man in the street. Briefly put, they amounted to the thesis that politically America could do no wrong and that military safety lay in massive retaliation. Any attempt to change the *status quo* by force was aggression and must be checked not with expensive local wars but with the threat of a thermonuclear strike by Strategic Air Command.

It reflects no credit on the West that it was not until the Russians

themselves had the means for massive retaliation that this doctrine was seriously questioned. Now there is hardly a single major American writer or political thinker who has failed to point out its flaws; from their combined views a coherent collective policy has emerged which looks like becoming the orthodox doctrine of the new régime.

The first two books are academic criticisms of the Dulles-Curtis le May policy. Dr. Tucker is not very concerned with criticism, he sets out to show that Dulles was only formulating more articulately a number of propositions which underlay all American thinking on war and foreign policy. These propositions are approximately: war is never necessary except in self-defence; but once a war is launched the demands of military necessity are absolute; the peoples never want war; but in the conduct of a war no distinction can be made between the innocent enemy population and the evil few who misled them; American national interest will always be identical with the overriding moral law; preventive war must always be wrong but wars of self-defence are not only right but also easily identifiable as being in self-defence; finally any war that is in origin defensive will be a just war quite irrespective of the methods by which it is waged and the objectives for which it is ultimately fought.

Dr. Tucker is not so successful in countering these assumptions but he certainly asks the right questions. Not only does he discuss the moral justification for a "second strike" which can no longer be termed as in any sense defensive, but he also raises the point as to whether a world order based on deterrence would really be viable at all; "a perfectionist view of deterrence must still represent a strategy imposing exorbitant moral risks precisely because its effective implementation would necessarily involve a claim to what is essentially a monopoly of force, yet a monopoly of force to be exercised over a world that is deeply divided". Such a world order would be based not upon consent but upon coercion.

The Princeton symposium criticises the concept of massive retaliation on more narrowly political and strategic lines. It is divided into six sections consisting of a general analysis of the problem by Dr. Turner followed by a case study by a specialist. Dr. Turner deals with the problem of a limited war and Martin Lichtermann illustrates it by the example of Korea. He considers the influence of weapons systems on the conduct of diplomacy, and James E. King, Jr., writes on N.A.T.O.; following an analysis of the rôles of air and sea power in modern wars, Dr. Robert Coakley shows how the U.S. Army is fitting itself to use both. The lesson in each case is that it is essential for America to equip herself with mobile conventional forces capable of fighting limited wars; partly in the interests of sheer survival for "if Americans fail to ask themselves what their objectives are in future wars, or answer with the one word 'victory', they will bury themselves . . . and they will take the rest of the world with them", and partly in order to maintain and forward American foreign policy. The authors also realise that America and Russia are not alone in the world; there are allies and neutrals to be considered and "in a world of power politics balanced military forces constitute the most effective instrument of pressure", and air power must be integrated with such forces. "Air power is the ability to command the air, so that land and sea forces may exercise limited control in their own right", a revolutionary definition which lays as much stress on transport as on combat aircraft.

The measure of general agreement these views now enjoy amongst American political thinkers is demonstrated by the third book; a survey of the studies on American world policy carried out for the Fulbright Committee of the Senate on Foreign Relations by thirteen academic centres of research into defence and foreign policy in the United States.

The general lines of an agreed policy emerge clearly—an approach to

Communist China, the initiation of land reform programmes in under-developed countries, support of the European Common Market, pursuit of arms control negotiations, development of the invulnerable deterrent and the strengthening of mobile forces for the conduct of limited war. The recommendations of the report on "Developments in Military Technology and their Influence on U.S. Strategic and Foreign Policy", again written largely by Mr. James King, are reproduced with remarkable fidelity in President Kennedy's early message to Congress.

For six years John Foster Dulles was the State Department. To all intents and purposes he was the prime mover of American foreign policy. Although the authors of "Duel at the Brink" would not agree that he overrode the President; in fact he cleared with Eisenhower "every substantive action . . . every significant move he was to make", the fact remains that Eisenhower gave to his Secretary of State unsurpassed authority and that his telephone calls to the President "were the calls of a lawyer to his client". There was no question of Dulles' sincerity and courage, nor of the reality of his religious faith, but his moralistic-legalistic approach to the conduct of foreign policy had the most disastrous results. Blunders such as the vaunted "liberation" of Soviet satellites with its cruel aftermath, vacillation and obstinacy over Indo-China, pointless brinkmanship over Formosa and Quemoy and Matsu, the abrupt withdrawal of the Aswan dam offer leading directly to the Suez catastrophe were hardly to be expected from a man who had spent a lifetime studying foreign affairs. Nor can his progressive rug-pulling from under the feet of his allies throughout the Suez crisis be easily forgiven, his repudiation of his own plan for a Canal Users' Association and refusal to help to stop the run on sterling which gave Eden, whom he deeply disliked, the *coup de grâce*. As a man his virtues outweighed his faults; unfortunately this was not the case with the policy-maker.

The Necessity for Choice. Henry A. Kissinger. *Chatto & Windus*. 30s.

Mr. Kissinger, American student of strategy, has taken a prominent part in the later stages of a debate on the effectiveness of a policy based on nuclear deterrence. While at first inclined to embrace it, he has since found cause to change his mind. He no longer believes, if he ever did, that it is sufficient in itself.

One reason for such a change of view is the constantly shifting world situation. Technological advances alter the character and potentiality of weapons. New countries acquire the capability of manufacturing them; today France, tomorrow China, the day after tomorrow half a dozen others. The balance of power alters, and with it the balance of terror; national leaders change and with them national policies; a stable *status quo* is unobtainable. Most of the infuriating shifts in Soviet policy in arms control, disarmament, or nuclear tests, have resulted from such changes. This holds equally good for the West; as when in 1956 the Anglo-American representatives at the Disarmament Conference rejected what they themselves had proposed a year earlier as soon as the Soviet accepted it. It is no longer possible to make a clear-cut line of demarcation between nuclear and conventional war since the U.S.A. has developed nuclear weapons with less destructive power than that of some conventional ones. Instead of a sharp dichotomy, there is a whole range of choice between one end of the scale and the other and therefore an increased risk of escalation. As a result, Mr. Kissinger believes that the Western powers must be so organised and equipped as to be able to wage war at any point on the spectrum, from a local incident to an all-out attack.

The necessity of choice of the title refers to the need to be in a position to opt for any and every policy. But which would be chosen in any

given situation would be a matter for the most intricate and nerve-testing political calculations, and these are the main theme of his book. What makes such calculations particularly difficult is the fact that the balance of terror is uneven. At the technical level the Russians are at the moment further advanced in the development of rocket propulsion for extreme ranges—terrestrially speaking this may be partly redressed by the rocket-carrying nuclear submarine *Polaris*—whereas the Americans have rocket bases much nearer Russian soil than vice versa. Another factor is Intelligence, and here the Russians are acknowledged to have a decided advantage—but this could be an asset as giving reassurance of the real aims of the other party. And provided that there is mutual recognition of the desirability of “mutual invulnerability” it should be possible to include Intelligence in a carefully calculated system of safeguards.

But what remains unknown is the psychological balance, *i.e.* will what would deter us equally deter our opponents? So long as the Americans, the Russians and the Western Europeans remain such different people, with a different way of life, standard of living and political system, we are almost certain of the contrary. Is the level of acceptable damage such, that the American capacity to inflict physical destruction on Russia is as strong a deterrent as the Russian capacity to inflict it upon America? Again almost certainly not. On the other hand, the rising Soviet standards are having *some* effect. In 1954 Malenkov was rebuked for the suggestion that nuclear war was equally catastrophic for communist and capitalist states. But there has, as yet, been no such overt rebuke for Major General Tolensky, when he wrote in *Moscow International Affairs* last year “the world population will be reduced by one-half as a result of a new global war. Moreover the most active capable and civilized portion of mankind would be wiped out. It should also be borne in mind that the material and technological basis for life would be destroyed. . . . Humanity would be thrown back and its way to communism would become immensely longer.” If, however, this was or is the prevailing official Soviet view, it can change overnight.

The public debate that is part of the democratic process can be demoralizing. In Britain government decisions are arrived at in private and when made public can provoke an indignant outcry. Sandys’ announcement that in certain circumstances Britain might be prepared to initiate nuclear war was a gift to the C.N.D. In the United States the position is much worse, for policy-making itself is done in public with all the opportunities offered for rash and unconsidered statements and the application of pressure in favour of this or that special interest. The Russian government are, on the contrary, in complete control of the process at every stage. There is also the different interpretation of “peaceful co-existence”. Though here the West had few illusions even before the meeting of the Communist parties in Moscow in December 1960 had defined it as the struggle for the world by all means short of armed conflict. The Summit Conference is also a weapon in this struggle; as Khrushchev said, “History teaches us that conferences reflect in their decisions an established balance of forces resulting from victory or capitulation in war or similar circumstances”, *i.e.* they recognise what has happened and carry it a stage further, and that is exactly what occurred at the Geneva Conference at the end of the Indo-Chinese War. Summit Conferences are not therefore always to be avoided but they should be employed as the Soviets employ them. Kissinger has now taken the advice he gives at the end of his book, and from a critical bystander has become an intellectual in politics, as adviser to President Kennedy taking responsibility in policy-making decisions. It will be most interesting to read his next book when he is free to write it.

Political Community in the North Atlantic Area. International Organisation in the light of Historical Experience. Karl W. Deutch and others. *Princeton University Press. London, Oxford University Press.* 38s.

The central most urgent and most pressing problem of our time is the abolition of war. During the past decades there has been endless argument and a concomitant spate of books and pamphlets dealing with the subject from every conceivable angle, but it is no nearer solution. This constructive and original investigation tackles the question from an unusual and most promising angle. In certain limited areas war has in actual fact been eliminated—how did this come about? In this first volume the author examines the experiences of Germany, the Hapsburg Empire, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Switzerland.

Communities where a sense of solidarity is now so strong that changes are made by means of "institutionalised procedures" without resort to force are of two kinds, formal amalgamations such as the United States, or pluralistic areas in which sovereignty is not formally merged as with Canada and America—to which perhaps might now be added the evolving British Commonwealth, which cuts across both definitions. Not all of either kind succeed. The causes underlying success or failure are painstakingly analysed.

The second volume will present the final conclusions drawn. In the meantime the authors suggest that since integration has gone furthest in the United States, Canada and Britain, these States could well form a nucleus of North Atlantic power. Such a policy could be promoted by increasing functional organisation, either within N.A.T.O.—which presents certain difficulties in view of its composition—or alongside it. This is a book of outstanding value, more especially as the arguments deployed are supported by hard facts. It should be prescribed reading for all advocates of world federation.

British Foreign Policy since the Second World War. C. M. Woodhouse. *Hutchinson.* 30s.

Mr. Woodhouse, a former member of the Foreign Service and an ex-director of Chatham House, has set out to make a more intensive study of the limits within which British foreign policy has had to be conducted since the end of World War Two, and of the interplay between internal circumstances, the international situation and the policy of the government. He describes in general what the policy has been, and whether it has been well or ill conducted in the given context, without much critical analysis. The most important sections deal with the changes in the international situation as a whole. The relations between the Great Powers have moved since 1950 to a state of "deadlock" in which a major war is unlikely, which might even mean a state of permanent peace between them. We were much nearer war earlier, between 1946 and 1954. In the Korean War the Great Powers were not openly engaged, (China was not and is not even now, considered as a Great Power) and the U.S.A. only through an intermediary. That the stalemate is due to the development of nuclear weapons is only half true; the other half is that the present power distribution is the most stable experienced since 1902. The period from the 1890s to 1945 was one in which there were rapidly changing disparities in the balance of power but meanwhile a rough equality of strength, was steadily building up. Now, following the second World War, there are only two world powers, Russia and America, neither of whom can hope to defeat the other no matter what allies they may gain to support them. The result will be to lock up the world in a solid framework for a long time ahead. The struggle to get the most advantageous positions before the

final freeze sets in may result in local wars fought over local issues with conventional weapons but not in a world war—struggles such as those in Laos, Viet-Nam, Singapore and Malaya will be contained. The author, however, shares the fear that if the lesser powers are armed with nuclear weapons they may be less cautious in their policies. He contends that this country is much stronger than in 1900 and has a great part still to play. It is right to equip ourselves with nuclear weapons, in any case they are much the cheapest form of military power. The importance of N.A.T.O. will steadily decrease as the realities of the international situation become apparent. He is hopeful about the final outcome but sceptical of the value of European integration, and still more of the wisdom of Britain joining it. A lucid and interesting exposition of the author's views, compellingly set forth.

Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. } Lewis F. Richardson. London, *Stevens*.
Arms and Insecurity. } Set £5 15s. 0d. Single volumes 63s.

The author, who died in 1953, was a mathematician and a pacifist, a Fellow of the Royal Society, and a Quaker.

"Arms and Insecurity" is a mathematical study of the interrelation of the causes and origin of arms races and how they lead to war.

"Statistics of Deadly Quarrels" is an attempt to correlate wars, and other human encounters ending in deaths, with a variety of measurable phenomena.

Richardson has applied his mathematical virtuosity to the studying of these questions, but the philosophical and historical grounds on which his mathematics rest are not always secure and his method results in the use of a mechanistic determinism and some startling and unsupported assumptions, such as that the incidence of trade between two States is a measure of their co-operation. But the writing has entailed rigorous study and research carried out over many years. The books are important, therefore, not for their conclusions, which are highly questionable, but for the mass of material they contain and for their stimulation to fresh thought on some jejune issues. They are, however, in spite of their editors' belief unlikely, at the least, to become the foundation of a new science. Mathematics applied to the political scene, with whatever skill and insight, leave out of account too many imponderables.

The Control of the Arms Race. Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age. Hedley Bull. *Weidenfeld & Nicolson*. 12s. 6d.

This is the second important research publication from the Institute of Strategic Studies carried out by a young Australian scholar with the help of a Study Group. His aim has been to lift the subject out of the realm of morbid emotion and to consider it critically, in cold blood. His academic training in philosophy will certainly have assisted him to that end. He has produced an admirably comprehensive and hard-hitting analysis of the "factors behind the present balance of terror" which does not recommend any particular course of action save a continuation of the present balance of power on a more secure basis. He argues that the concept of an arms race is inapplicable to the present situation between the great powers in which the overriding interest of both sides is not to win a nuclear war but to prevent it happening. What is necessary is equilibrium, not superiority. For nuclear weapons are the only ones of which it is true to say, as did President Eisenhower, that "enough is enough, and more than enough is not better than enough". In fact, the race has already ended in deadlock.

The author considers in turn the objectives and conditions of arms control, arms control through disarmament, arms control without disarmament, and the frightening problem of continuous innovation in the means

of destruction at the disposal of mankind; an innovation which has so far rendered all scientific methods of control, however sophisticated, out of date before they are elaborated.

Some of the concluding arguments based on the then existing test ban are already vitiated by the unilateral resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, followed by America, but his main thesis stands—that the way to achieve stability and control is not by nuclear disarmament but by the balance of Soviet-American power. Such a balance of power might well be adopted by States which are sovereign, armed and divided, in order to avoid the danger of complete mutual destruction. It is to be hoped, but the hope is a faint one, that unilateralists could be persuaded to read this book, for in the present situation the achieving of their aims might very likely precipitate the evil they wish to avoid.

The book has a foreword by Richard Gould Adams and a short note by John Strachey whose plea, in view of the latest developments, is scarcely still applicable.

Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin. George F. Kennan. *Hutchinson*. 40s.

The main theme of this book is the dilemma which has confronted, and still confronts, the Western Powers as a result of the sudden entry, in 1917, of a revolutionary new State into the community of Nations. Based upon a series of lectures delivered to British students, it is not concerned with Russia as such but with the foreign policy problem she presents for the West. The author has sketched in just sufficient background of the internal evolution of the Soviet Union to enable the average student to grasp the vagaries of her foreign policy.

Once it was clear that the world revolution was not going to spread beyond the borders of Russia, Communist foreign policy was bound to pursue two contradictory objectives: to destroy bourgeois governments and, while “they continued to resist destruction”, to enjoy the advantages of normal intercourse with them”. This strategy is still with us in its new guise of “co-existence” and the West has not yet succeeded in finding an adequate answer to it.

Nobody is better equipped to say that the Western reaction to this challenge was, or what it should have been, than a former Ambassador to Moscow. As a professional diplomat he is shocked by the Soviet manner characterized as insulting. As a liberal conservative he abhors both communist practice and doctrine. But he feels that it is his duty as a loyal American to understand and explain the motives of his opponent. This is his main purpose here; a secondary one is to rebut the Soviet accusations of Western misbehaviour. The author tends to oversimplify the causes of the allied intervention in the revolutionary struggles although in fact it never amounted to very much; he brushes off Munich rather too lightly, and Stalin’s personal influence may seem to loom somewhat too large with all other factors, economic and social, given less than their due: but that his influence was finally decisive it is impossible to deny.

Mr. Kennan is at his best in dealing with the diplomatic manoeuvres in the background. His description of the way in which Germany was driven into Russia’s arms, and of the signature of the Rapallo Agreement in 1922, is masterly. In view of his authority his asides on American diplomatic methods and the snares of “summitry” are most enlightening. He sees the genesis of Western mistakes in the policy of “unconditional surrender” in the first world war. Our efforts to keep Russia in the war when she was no longer capable of fighting gave the Bolsheviks their chance to seize power; just as the terms of the Versailles Treaty and the treatment

of the Weimar Republic gave Hitler his. Once Stalin and Hitler held supreme power war was inevitable. For the war time alliance with Russia the West paid too high a price.

In his closing pages he returns to the problem of co-existence. His own attitude is based on two premises. War is no answer to Communism; a conclusion which the advent of nuclear bombs merely serves to reinforce: and international politics is not a field in which one can seek the absolute; it is essentially a field of constant flux. Russian behaviour was better under Lenin than under Stalin, and things are again altering in the Khrushchev era. Western diplomacy should avoid reflex action and should not react to images that may be ten years out of date. Many "Sovietologists seem afraid to admit to themselves or to others that Stalin is dead". It is to be hoped that Mr. Kennan will return to his task and bring his story up to date; by then we should know rather more about the relationship between the gradually changing Soviet society and Soviet foreign policy, and to what extent, if any, Khrushchev has fundamentally changed course.

Marxism : An Historical and Critical Study. George Lictheim. *Routledge.* 40s.

This is a real contribution to the study of an aspect of Marxism which is often overlooked, namely the interrelationship between Marxian theory and the historical circumstances in which it arose and flourished. This application of Marxian method to Marxian theory is an experiment which yields unexpectedly interesting results. The book is well and clearly written, entirely and blessedly free of the usual jargon, and will be most valuable to serious students as a pioneer effort in the field.

The author regards Marxism as a doctrinal link between the French and Russian revolutions and sets out to show how its theory and practice gradually developed under the impact of central European political and intellectual problems in the hundred years following 1848. After an introductory account of the heritage left by the French Revolution (1789-1870) there follows a brilliant summary, in less than twenty pages, of what he terms the "Marxian Synthesis" on a purely political plane. The story ends a century later with "The Dissolution of the Marxian System 1918-1948".

Both those that are newcomers to the subject and those who are familiar with the tortuous, Alice through the Looking Glass polemics of Marxians will find much enlightenment here. A critical analysis of ideology is skilfully interwoven with the historical account of the various phases through which the socialist movement passed during this turbulent period.

The most enthralling part of the book is concerned with the last phase of Marxism, inaugurated by the Russian Revolution and culminating in the "petrification" of the doctrine after the Second World War. The essence of the author's thesis is the description of Leninism as an "ideology" in the Marxian sense: "*i.e.* as a system of thought which obscures the facts it purports to describe in particular in the systematic misuse of the term 'proletarian revolution' to describe the totalitarian rearrangement of society *after* the capture of power by a party". He easily demonstrates that Marxism has stagnated since the 1930s, notwithstanding, or perhaps because, it has become the official ideology in the Soviet orbit; and that there is little or no relation between its relevance and adequacy to conditions today and the expansion of Communism. This should be required reading for all those who are vaguely "on the left wing".

Power and Policy in the USSR. R. Conquest. *Macmillan.* 35s.

Current Soviet history is a quaking bog into which the earnest inquirer is

more than likely to be sucked. Wherever he turns, he is confronted by gaps and shifts in the available evidence. Essentially, for Mr. Conquest is a Kremlinologist, this book is the political story of the struggle for Stalin's succession. The Doctor's Plot is quoted as proof of the existence of such a struggle for some time prior to Stalin's death. The author covers the fall of Beria, the premiership and collapse of Malenkov, and the famous Twentieth Congress of 1956 with Krushchev's flaming denunciation of Stalin. The author describes the climate of the anti-Party group in 1957 and the rise of Krushchev and gives an assessment of his present power. He does not deal with Russian economic development, and the resulting social changes, but concentrates entirely upon the personalities and intrigues at the centre. As an intensive study within these limits it is useful and illuminating. It is well documented and Mr. Conquest is cautious in his acceptance of official facts and figures, which there are few or no means of checking.

The General Assembly of the United Nations. A Study of Procedure and Practice. Sydney D. Bailey. London, *Stevens for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. 30s.

How United Nations Decisions Are Made. John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann. Foreword by Paul G. Hoffman. Leyden, *A. W. Sythoff*. FC.13.50.

Bloc Politics in the United Nations. Thomas Hovat, Jr. Foreword by Professor P. Bloomfield. *Harvard University Press*. London, *Oxford University Press*. 52s.

These three books are all meant for the specialist concerned with the internal workings of the United Nations, and more particularly with the methods and procedures of the General Assembly. Mr. Bailey's book provides the healthful antidote to both the prevailing conceptions of that body; that of a mischief-making, irresponsible meddler, and that of the supreme arbiter of world affairs at whose words the nations should bow down. He gives a minutely detailed account of how it deals with political disputes, but is largely unconcerned with policy. His study is complemented by that of Messrs. Hadwen and Kaufmann, since they concentrate on the economic rather than the political aspect of the General Assembly's activities and are more interested in informal procedures than in the formal machinery of organisation. They give a very good account of the unfruitful negotiations for the setting-up of a special United Nations fund for economic development: for such a united effort competing national interests are still probably too strong.

The heart of Mr. Hovat's book is the 70-page diagrammatic examination of each of the eight "caucusing groups" and the one (Soviet) "caucusing bloc". The fact that the Soviet Union is still in a relatively weak voting position is clearly shown and the general fluidity of most of the voting groups is demonstrated once again. The author, however, considers that such groups are essential to effective negotiations within the General Assembly. Such quantitative analysis, though useful, is severely limited in its scope. The really surprising observation is that of Professor Bloomfield who says, in his foreword that the "most illuminating lesson is (that) no sound programme of peaceful co-operation can afford to neglect the truth that the political process—including the politics of blocs—is going to characterise man's efforts to govern himself at each and every level". One wonders whether, as is implied, it is only now that this astounding revelation has been vouchsafed to American political scientists studying international affairs.

The Supreme Command 1914-1918. Lord Hankey. *Allen and Unwin.*
2 vols. 84s.

Lord Hankey lived at the heart of affairs throughout the first World War. Without the responsibility for taking day to day decisions with the most momentous consequences, he was in constant contact with those who were. He was free both to observe and participate. A man of outstanding competence in manipulating all the machinery of government minutes, files, precedents; never at a loss for the right word, the tactful action, the necessary prompting when memory momentarily failed; above all a man of the utmost discretion who moved amongst the indiscreet, heard everything, remembered everything and repeated nothing, he oiled the hinges and kept the wheels turning whatever storms might rage in the Cabinet. The claim that "these pages abound with sidelights on the conduct of the war" is amply justified. Based on Lord Hankey's diaries they are indispensable both for the historian of war and for the student of the machinery of national and international government. He shrank from the limelight, refused high office, correctly appreciating that he could make his best contribution by seeing to it that Ministers and their technical advisers moved smoothly along the procedural lines he laid down for them.

He adds new details to the emergence of Lloyd George's small and efficient new Cabinet from the chaos of committees which Asquith had inherited from his Victorian predecessors. While appreciating Asquith's qualities his admiration goes to Lloyd George who is the "man who won the war", but he remained friends with both. He made no enemies and the only people he appears to really dislike are President Wilson and Colonel House, probably as a result of America's belated entry into the war. His book abounds with vivid anecdotes, one of the best is Fisher's outburst "You can no more tame war than you can tame hell!", and judicious advice. For instance "It is always a mistake . . . for delegates to meet without a secretary, especially when it is a case of discussing a draft. This requires the whole attention of one man, particularly when there are two languages". This is something that will be appreciated far beyond the confines of Whitehall on which the book is concentrated. The only major event which goes practically unrecorded is the second revolution in Russia in 1917, neither Lenin nor Trotsky are even named, a proof of how the most significant event can make no impression at the time it occurs.

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